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I. INTRODUCTION

Debt and equity are like sibling rivals within the traditional agency cost framing of
the firm. Shareholders, within that construct, may be inclined to resist new investment
that principally benefits creditors, with the result that value-enhancing projects are
delayed or abandoned. 1 Lenders, as well, risk the loss of wealth in the face of management opportunism that favors equity over debt. 2 One response, ultimately at cost to the
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School (Fall 2008). I greatly appreciate the thoughtful comments and contributions of Greg Alexander,
Bob Bone, Steven Davidoff, Vic Fleischer, Mike Klausner, Andrew Kull, Curtis Milhaupt, Steve Schwarcz,
David Walker, Brad Wendel, and participants in the AALS Section on Business Associations 2009 annual
meeting, the Boston University School of Law Faculty Workshop, the Canadian Law and Economics
Association 2008 annual meeting, and the Cornell Law School Faculty Workshop, as well as the valuable
research assistance provided by Meghan Bailey, Lauren O'Leary, Mendy Piekarski, and Lauren Turner. The
usual disclaimers apply.
1. Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcON. 147, 148-49 (1977).
2. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334-39 (1976); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting:An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979). Examples of the
tension between debt and equity are set out in Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New
Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 453-54 (1999) (proposing a new
governance structure for public corporate bonds). See also Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi & William F.
Maxwell, Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 693,
717 (2005) (finding that firms with corporate governance provisions favoring shareholders are charged a higher
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borrower, is increased covenants that restrict its actions and potentially furnish control
rights to lenders. 3 Covenants and monitoring were presumed to be the least costly means
to manage credit risk 4 in the absence of alternatives, such as portfolio risk management,
that did not exist for debt at the time the agency cost construct was introduced. 5
Most corporate debt is private, 6 and most private lenders are banks. 7 Consistent with
the role of debt within the traditional framing, 8 covenants act as early warning "trip
wires" 9 that assist banks to manage credit risk, permitting them to reassess a borrower's
managers when weakened financial conditions increase the risk of opportunism and
mitigate loss by renegotiating loans in anticipation of, or following, a breach. 10 Banks are
able to monitor a borrower's compliance at low cost, reinforcing the importance of loan
covenants to corporate governance. 11 The trade-off for banks is the relative inability to
transfer the loans they originate to others, further boosting their reliance on covenants and
monitoring. 12

cost of debt financing).
3. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 338; MARK CAREY ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE
PLACEMENT MARKET II (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Study No. 166, Dec. 1993). A
lender's cost of monitoring, for example, may be passed on to the borrower. Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry
and FinancingArrangements: Evidencefrom SyndicatedLoans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 630-31 (2007).
4. In this Article, "credit risk" is defined as a lender's exposure to the possibility that a borrower will fail
to perform its obligations under a loan or other credit instrument, principally the payment of principal and
interest.
5. 1 mark the introduction of the agency cost construct as the publication of Jensen and Meckling's
seminal article in 1976. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2.
6. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 231-39 (noting the shift of large
firm borrowings from banks to the public markets); Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and
Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 2, 8-9 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-466240 (finding that, in 1993-2001, private corporate debt more than doubled public
debt).
7. Amihud et al., supra note 2, at 458; Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies
and the Mix of Privateand Public Debt Claims, 51 J. FIN. 1863, 1870-79 (1996) (tracking the debt structure of
250 publicly traded firms between 1980 and 1990); Marcel. Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private vs. Public
Lending: Evidence from Covenants 11-13 (UCLA, Anderson Grad. Sch. Mgmt., Paper 13-93, 1993) (finding
that private debt agreements control management actions more than public debt).
8. Jensen and Meckling referred to both "bonds," see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 336, and
"loans," see id. at 334, when describing the role of debt in managing agency cost. This Article's focus on bank
loans reflects their greater significance to working capital and capital structure.
9. George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive CorporateGovernance, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093-94 (1995).
10. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134-35 (1989) (explaining
borrowers' incentives to engage in opportunism); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Default and Renegotiation: A
Dynamic Model of Debt, 63 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 (1998) (describing the role of renegotiation in the lender-borrower
relationship).
11. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. In this Article, I refer to "corporate governance" as a
mechanism to reduce or deter agency costs arising from management incentives or actions that impede the
maximization of firm value. The role of covenants and monitoring in corporate governance is more fully
described in Triantis & Daniels, supra note 9, at 1082-1104. See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 33742; Smith & Warner, supranote 2, at 121-24.
12. Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateralas Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN.
1113, 1114 (1995) (explaining that covenants increase a bank's incentive to monitor by decreasing its payoff if
it fails to do so); see also infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 34 J. Corp. L. 642 2008-2009

2009]

The Evolution of Debt

Balanced against those costs, a firm can improve its borrowing capacity and increase
its share price through the debt capital available to fund new projects and the positive
signal provided by new lending. 13 The resulting benefits can be tangible-a decline in
the overall cost of capital as investors free-ride on the enhanced oversight provided by
self-interested bank monitors. 14 Thus, the competing interests of debt and equity are
balanced by the benefits of a capital structure that includes both. Like siblings, the result
is a virtuous, if not always peaceful, equilibrium within the firm.
But, clearly, change is afoot. As the capital market becomes more complete, 15 we
may expect credit risk to be transferred and shared among market participants at lower
cost than if borne separately. 16 The last two decades, in fact, witnessed an increase in
private credit liquidity-as illustrated by the rise in syndicated loans 17 and credit derivativesl 8 -fueled by change in the traditional bank-borrower relationship and the entry of
new investors into the credit market. Banks began to manage credit risk through
purchases and sales of loans and other credit exposure, generating higher returns on their
loan portfolios, a portion of which could be passed on to borrowers through increased
lending limits and lower interest rates. Weighed against those benefits were greater
agency costs principally arising from the limited information about borrowers available
in the market and the dispersed ownership traditionally associated with public debt, but

13. Stewart C. Myers, Still Searchingfor Optimal CapitalStructure, in ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING? 80, 83-88 (Richard W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1989); Eugene F.
Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 36-37 (1985).
14. Jensen & Meckling, supranote 2, at 337-39; Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon,
What Else Mattersfor Corporate Governance: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REv. 991, 1039 (2008)
(finding that the benefits of bank monitoring are the greatest for companies with free cash flow and significant
management entrenchment); Bradley & Roberts, supranote 6, at 1-4.
15. The theoretical basis for complete capital markets is set out in KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 121-43 (1976); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation
of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD. 91, 91-96 (1964); and Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of
an Equilibriumfor a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265-66 (1954).
16. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLuM. L. REV. 231, 243-53 (2008) (describing the impact of
market completeness on the risk-bearing function of equity); Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk
Transfer: Implications for FinancialStability 1-2 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, July
2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.pdf'?noframes=l (noting that credit risk transfer
instruments improve financial stability by dispersing risks among investors).
17. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. My focus in this Article is on the use of credit derivatives to hedge credit risk and the impact of growth in the private credit market on corporate governance. Yet,
for many, derivatives are associated with the financial blowups of the 1990s and, more recently, with concern
over credit market speculation with respect to companies that appear to be financially troubled. See Gretchen
Morgenson, In the Fed's Cross Hairs: Exotic Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BUI. The growth of the
credit derivatives market has also raised regulatory and systemic risk concerns over the ability to document and
settle an increasing number of over-the-counter transactions, Michael M. Grynbaum, As Losses Mount, the Fed
and the White House Step Up; Derivatives Trading Is Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at Cl,
uncertainty about the legal effect of swap agreements, Gretchen Morgenson & Vikas Bajaj, MBIA Debt Is
Setting up a Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at Cl, and the lack of transparency in the private credit
market, Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Desperatefor a Solution, but Who Understands the Problem?,
INT'L HERALD TRtB. (Paris), Mar. 25, 2008, at 15. A discussion of the risks of speculation and the systemic
issues surrounding credit derivatives is included in Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and
Perilsof Credit Derivatives,75 U. CN. L. REV. 1019, 1032-50 (2007).
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increasingly a feature of private credit. 19
On balance, we would anticipate an increase in the ability of firms to incur debt-an
outcome that, on its face, was consistent with the higher levels of borrowing that occurred
in the mid-1990s and during the most recent private equity wave. 20 When the credit
market soured, partly due to difficulty in valuing new credit instruments, the fallout was
seemingly ubiquitous-with losses, beginning in the summer of 2007, ranging globally
22
from government investment pools in Florida 21 to agricultural cooperatives in Japan.
Changes in the credit market likewise affected the supply of capital. A substantial drop in
the price of leveraged loans reportedly resulted in a slowdown in secondary loan trading
23
and, in turn, a bottleneck in new commercial lending.
Thus, a firm's decision to borrow must increasingly take into account change in the
credit market beyond the traditional bank-borrower relationship that underlies the
standard framing of the firm, a trend that I argue is likely to continue after the current
credit crisis has passed. 24 That shift suggests an evolution in the factors that shape a
firm's capital structure, from the agency cost construct, based on the sibling rivalry of
debt and equity, to one that must now increasingly take account of the costs and benefits

25
of an increasingly liquid private credit market.

Likewise, to the extent developments in the credit market affect how credit risk is
managed, the traditional reliance on covenants and monitoring may also begin to evolve.
Covenants and monitoring may no longer be the lowest cost means to manage credit risk,
shaping their role, and the role of debt, within corporate governance. How will those
changes be reflected?
One argument is that the ability to transfer or diversify away credit risk-the

19. See infra notes 36-64, 123-27, 155 and accompanying text.
20. See Thomas Boulton, Kenneth Lehn & Steven Segal, The Rise of the US. PrivateEquity Market, in
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 141, 142, 14951 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (finding that the number, market value, and industry distribution of companies going private has increased over time); Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 378-85 (describing the
aggressive growth of large U.S. banks, beginning in the mid-1990s, in high-risk syndicated lending). Other
factors, such as declining interest rates and investors' search for higher yielding investments, also helped
borrowers to obtain capital at low cost. Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Money Binge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at
H1 (describing increase in private equity funds' access to cheap debt).
21. Michael Peltier, Florida Probes Countrywide over Subprime Loans, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN3134915520080131 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
22. Yuka Hayashi & Kazuhiro Shimamura, Subprime Woes Hit Norinchukin Bank in Japan, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 2007, at C8.
23. See Liz Rappaport & Peter Lattman, 'Anyone For Some Used Corporate Debt?'-Why Leveraged
Loans That FinancedBuyouts Are CausingBottleneck, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at C 1.
24. See infra notes 226-48 and accompanying text (describing preliminary lessons from the current credit
crisis).
25. This Article joins other, recent scholarship on the impact of financial markets on capital structure. See,
e.g., Michael Faulkender & Mitchell A. Petersen, Does the Source of CapitalAffect CapitalStructure?, 19 REV.
FIN. STUD. 45, 45-47 (2006) (examining how market frictions constrain a firm's capital structure); Sheridan
Titman, The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and the Integration of FinancialMarkets, 31 FIN. MGMT. 101,
104-05 (2002) (discussing how market conditions constrain the source of capital); Mark T. Leary, Bank Loan
Supply, Lender Choice, and CorporateCapitalStructure 2-3 (Cornell Univ., The Johnson Sch., Research Paper
No. 10-08, 2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/news-and-conferences/conferences-and events/
files/2006_bsc leary.pdf (studying the effects of credit market expansion and contraction on firm capital
structure in the 1960s).
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"decoupling" of economic and control rights 26-will limit the effectiveness of covenants
and weaken debt governance by dampening a lender's incentive to monitor borrowers or
act in the interest of others to whom loans or credit exposure have been transferred. Thus,
changes in the private credit market-and the resulting commoditization of creditreflect a tension between the potential benefits of transferring credit risk and the frictions
that may result from growing liquidity. Counterparties who take on that credit risk, the
analysis goes, may be better able to manage it at lower cost, but are unable to oversee
borrowers as effectively, resulting in an increase in agency costs and an overall decline in
governance. 27 Moreover, based on their special knowledge of each borrower's credit
quality, banks may have an incentive to transfer lower quality assets to third parties28
with a decline in lender oversight for those borrowers most in need of debt governance.
However, as I argue, that may not be the complete answer.
Banks have a significant incentive to minimize the potential for moral hazard arising
from the information asymmetries around borrowers for whom there is limited public
information. Spanning that gap-by designing resale arrangements in order to address
potential agency problems-may increase a bank's ability to transfer loans at lower cost,
as well as to enhance profitability. 29 Thus, as the private credit market becomes more
liquid, loans may be structured and lending relationships adjusted to mitigate agency
costs. Retaining some portion of a borrower's credit risk, increasingly relying on
reputation, and tightening covenant levels, for example, may offset the weakened
oversight otherwise arising from the transfer of credit risk. 30 Rather than a decline, those
changes may instead provide alternative means of corporate governance.
One interesting possibility is prompted by growth of liquidity in the credit market
itself. In a more complete market, actions that affect a firm's credit quality are reflected
in changes in the price at which a firm's loans and other credit instruments trade. Those
changes may affect a borrower's cost of capital-either in subsequent loans, including a
change in the price and nonprice terms on which the loans are made, 3 1 or most recently,
by tying the interest rate on loan facilities to the price of a borrower's credit default
swaps. 32 The intuition is that, like public equity, private credit may begin to provide a
26. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and HybridDecoupling: Governance and Systemic
Risk Implications, 14 EuR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 681 (2008) (discussing how debt decoupling can pose risks for
debt governance).
27. See id. at 681-90; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 18, at 1033-34 (describing the inability of certain
counterparties to provide meaningful monitoring of borrowers).
28. See ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & Jo.o A.C. SANTOS, HAS THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET LOWERED
THE COST OF CORPORATE DEBT? 5-6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 290, 2007), available at

http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr290.html (finding that the decline in monitoring as a result
of hedging increases the cost of debt for risky and less transparent firms).
29. See George G. Pennacchi, Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital, 43 J. FIN. 375, 376 (1988)
(demonstrating the positive effect of designing loan resale contracts to minimize moral hazard).
30. See infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text (discussing responses to changes in the private credit
market as a means to reduce agency costs and the potential decline in corporate governance).
31. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, for example, tied their lending commitments to the price of
credit insurance on their own debt. Increases in the price of that insurance impacted the terms on which they
could borrow funds, resulting in a parallel reduction in their own lending obligations. Henny Sender, MS and
Goldman Change Approach to Lending, FT.COM, Aug. 17, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f84f56c-6c8dIdd-96dc-0000779fdI 8c,dupuuid=66e07d0-66ca-l Idd-808f-0000779fdl 8c.html.
32. See Pierre Paulden & Caroline Hyde, Citigroup, Credit Suisse Link Loans to Swaps in Shift,
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discipline-through the feedback furnished by market participants-that complements
33
the traditional protections provided by contract.
Greater capital market completeness also raises an intriguing question: Do the
changes in debt, when coupled with the increased staying power of private equity, 34
foretell the possibility of a more basic shift in capital structure and corporate governance?
For equity, a firm may increasingly choose to rely on private sources of risk capital,
rather than on public share ownership. For debt, lenders may shift from their traditional
dependence on covenants and monitoring in private loans to lower cost instruments that
trade with increasing liquidity in an evolving credit market. Taken together, I suggest, we
may begin to see the outline of an alternative capital and corporate governance structure
whose evolution-from public to private capital, for equity; and private to increasingly
public capital, for debt-reflects a new set of costs and benefits beyond those within the
35
traditional framing.
The recent subprime loan crisis, however, has been blamed on the introduction of
new credit instruments, calling into question the viability of a governance structure that
relies, in part, on an increasingly liquid private credit market. To what extent did agency
problems arising from the transfer of subprime loans to third-party purchasers limit, or
even exceed, the benefits from financial innovation that fueled the rise in subprime
liquidity? 36 And is there likely to be a similar cost-benefit outcome within the corporate
credit market, portending a decline in private credit liquidity and the new role of private
credit in corporate governance?
Although agency problems in the securitization market have begun to receive
national attention, concerns over those problems have troubled industry participants,
investors, and academics for some time, 37 sparked, in the case of the subprime market, by
Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alzQ3Jyk
fb7Y (describing the shift from pricing tied to debt ratings and LIBOR to pricing based on credit default swaps).
33. See infra notes 197-215 and accompanying text (analyzing the effects of an increasingly liquid private
credit market on a firm's cost of capital).
34. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 16, at 235-36 (suggesting that the private equity model may now be
available to a wider range of companies due to increasing financial market completeness); see also infra notes
216-20 and accompanying text (noting that advances in risk management and the ability to transfer risk may
reduce a firm's reliance on public shareholders).
35. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
36. Many subprime mortgages were extended by originating lenders that intended to transfer all or a
portion of their loans to third parties. The purchaser was often a securitization vehicle, or its sponsor, which
financed its purchase through the sale of securities to other investors. Very often those investors included other
securitization vehicles that would combine different subprime tranches, sometimes with derivatives tied to
subprime risk, and issue securities to a final tier of end-investors. Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 1, 12-19
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,398, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14398.
37. See Will Alexander et al., Some Loans are More Equal than Others: Third-Party Originationsand
Defaults in the Subprime Mortgage Industry, 30 REAL ESTATE ECON. 667, 695-96 (2002) (noting the increase
in coupons on broker-originated loans, reflecting the market's awareness of higher default risk); see also
Amany El Anshasy, Gregory Elliehausen & Yoshiaki Shimazaki, The Pricing of Subprime Mortgages by
Mortgage Brokers and Lenders 4-6 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.cambweb.org/main/cwo/pdfs/miscassets/GWbrokerstudy_06.pdf (describing potential agency
problems, but finding that borrowers did not pay more for broker-originated loans than for lender-originated
loans); Michael LaCour-Little, The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers: An Agency Problem?, 31 J.REAL ESTATE
RES. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 22-23), available at http://business.fullerton.edu/Finance/Joumal/
BLOOMBERG.COM,
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its rapid and substantial growth. 38 Many of the problems stemmed from the incentives of
loan brokers, who were paid to originate new loans but, following resale, bore none of the
direct economic consequences if those loans later declined in value. Brokers,
consequently, could misrepresent a prospective borrower's creditworthiness to
subsequent purchasers or extend "predatory" loans, with limited disclosure, to less
sophisticated borrowers in order to maximize their commissions. 39 Perhaps less
egregiously, mortgage brokers also faced incentives to chum existing loans by
encouraging borrowers to refinance and re-refinance mortgages in order to increase their
origination revenues. 40 Brokers, in addition, had less incentive to incur costs-such as
resources to collect "soft" information about a borrower's credit quality-beyond what
was necessary to identify loans that met the minimum, objective requirements to be transferred to third-party purchasers. 4 1 Finally, loan purchasers faced the risk that originators
would cherry-pick the assets they sold, transferring lower quality mortgages to less
knowledgeable investors while retaining higher quality mortgages on their own balance
sheets. 4 2 The resulting costs-evidenced by the recent, spectacular losses in the subprime
market-may have overwhelmed the benefits of risk diversification and increased
43
subprime liquidity that resulted from financial innovation.
There are, however, important differences between subprime mortgage loans and the
corporate debt underlying this Article's focus on the changing role of credit instruments.
By their nature, subprime mortgages rely on collateral-real property-rather than on
covenants as a principal means to manage a lender's credit risk, reducing the ongoing
need to monitor borrowers. Although lenders have traditionally -looked first to a
borrower's credit quality before extending a loan, if the borrower defaults, the lender's
credit risk is offset by its ability to realize value from sale of the underlying property. 44 In
the case of unsecured loans, a failure to monitor-or, with a decline in covenants, an
inability to adjust credit risk upon a change in a borrower's credit quality-may increase
the risk of a corporate loan without the fallback of collateral in the event of default.
Consequently, unlike subprime mortgages, a decline in covenants and monitoring is

papers/pdf/forth/accepted/Pricing%20ofo20motgages%20by%/o20brokers.pdf (finding loans to lower income or
poorer credit borrowers originated by mortgage brokers to be more expensive than comparable loans by direct
retail lenders).
38. Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans 5
(Dec. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1093137.
39. Anshasy et al., supra note 37, at 4; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDozo L. REV. 2185, 2255-56 (2007) (describing shortfalls in consumer protection laws).
40. Michael LaCour-Little & Gregory H. Chun, Third Party Originatorsand Mortgage Prepayment Risk:
An Agency Problem?, 17 J. REAL ESTATE RES. 55, 58-59 (1999) (finding higher rates of prepayment among
loans originated by mortgage brokers).
41. Keys et al., supra note 38, at 2-3.
42. Id. at 3.
43. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the
U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis 22-26 (Dec. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1072304 (testing various hypotheses regarding the growth
of the subprime loan market).
44. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 65152 (1992) (noting that, with mortgages, a lender's interaction with borrowers is typically limited to collecting
checks and reminding borrowers to maintain house insurance); Rajan & Winton, supra note 12, at 1135 (noting
that collateral obviates the need to investigate borrowers).
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understood to significantly alter the credit risk of a corporate loan, prompting (as I argue
45
in this Article) alternative means of debt governance.
The phenomenal rise in U.S. housing prices during the run-up to the subprime
crisis 4 6 may have further induced lenders to rely on collateral values to extend mortgage
loans, with limited consideration of a borrower's ability to repay her loans 47 and little
change in loan terms in response to variation in a borrower's credit quality. 4 8 The rise in
housing prices may not itself have induced greater subprime lending, 49 but the resulting
increase in collateral values may have overshadowed a borrower's poor credit quality and
minimized delinquency and foreclosure rates, since troubled borrowers were able to
50
easily refinance their loans or sell their homes.
Loan quality, consequently, declined in the subprime market in line with rising real
property values. Some portion of that decline reflected agency problems between loan
originators and appraisers, many of whom were reportedly pressured to hike a property's
value or risk the loss of future business. 5 1 The decline may have also reflected the
incentives of originators to pass lower-quality loans to third-party purchasers, in part
using securitization structures that were intended to address the heightened credit risk that
investors might bear. 52 Interestingly, while the evidence is still mixed, there is some
indication that the decline in lending and appraisal standards applied equally to those
loans kept on and off an originator's books. 53 That result likely reflected the practice of
some purchasers to buy randomly selected bundles of loans, with lenders unaware ex ante
of which loans they would retain. 54 Even after loans were transferred, the originator and
45. See infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text.
46. Gorton, supranote 36, at 5-6, 20.
47. Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 278-79 (1999) (noting the effect of
pressure to produce loans with minimal loan documentation); Luci Ellis, The Housing Meltdown: Why did it
Happen in the United States? 6, 21 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 259, Sept. 2008), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work259.pdf (describing the easing of individual lenders' underwriting standards).
48. Keys et al., supranote 38, at 13.
49. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 43, at 26-29 (raising a supply-based explanation for increases in
subprime lending).
50. Ellis, supra note 47, at 13; Janet L. Yellen, The Mortgage Meltdown, Financial Markets, and the
Economy, FRBSF ECON. NEWSLETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Nov. 7, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2008/el_2008-35-36.html.
51. George H. Lentz & Ko Wang, ResidentialAppraisaland the Lending Process:A Survey of Issues, 15
J. REAL EST. RES. 11, 25-26 (1998) (describing potential agency problems); see also OCTOBER RESEARCH
CORP., 2007 NATIONAL APPRAISAL SURVEY-A SNAPSHOT OF THE REAL ESTATE VALUATION INDUSTRY-

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 3 (2006), available at http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/newsadvocacy/downloads/
ltrs tstmny/2007/Ntnl ApprslSrvy.pdf (noting that 90% of respondents indicated pressure to adjust property
values upwards).
52. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2048-64 (2007) (describing the role of securitization in subprime
lending).
53. Keys et al., for example, found that a doubling of securitization volume on average is associated with a
20% increase in mortgage defaults. Keys et al., supra note 38, at 22. Ellis, by contrast, found that the growth in
payment arrears during the start of the subprime crisis applied equally to securitized loans and loans that
remained on an originator's balance sheet. Ellis, supra note 47, at 14.
54. Keys et al., supra note 38, at 3, 17; Ellis, supra note 47, at 14; see also Thomas W. Albrecht & Sarah
J. Smith, CorporateLoan Securitization: Selected Legal and Regulatory Issues, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
411, 426 (1998) (noting that, within homogenous asset types, assets for securitization are generally chosen at
random).
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underwriters often acquired ownership of a portion of the resulting securitized
by a market
instruments. 55 Thus, the risk of moral hazard may have been partly offset
56
risk.
credit
the
of
portion
some
retain
to
originators
required
that
discipline
What, then, fueled the decline in loan quality? No doubt, some portion can be
attributed to agency costs arising from the unbundling of the traditional bank-borrower
relationship. The substantial losses incurred by banks and other participants in the
securitization process, however, suggest that something else was also involved.
There is some evidence that moral hazard among institutional investors, fueled by
the unique nature of the subprime market, may have played a significant role. Investment
mandates by regulated purchasers of securitized assets are typically tied to credit ratings.
Pension funds, for example, may be restricted from investing in assets that are rated
below investment grade-without distinguishing between structured and corporate credit
ratings, 57 even though structured instruments typically provide a higher yield than their
corporate counterparts. 58 Consequently, asset managers have an incentive to invest in
securitized products, such as subprime mortgage instruments, in order to outperform their
peers or the benchmarks against which they are measured-trading credit quality for
yield, enhancing fund returns and their own management fees,59 and weakening the
pressure on loan originators to monitor a borrower's credit quality.
Part of an investor's ability to make that trade reflected the unique growth of the
subprime mortgage market, which witnessed unusually low default levels during the last
economic downturn in 2001-2003. Securitization sponsors relied on those default rates in
structuring new instruments, and rating agencies used them to assign credit ratings to the
resulting investment products. 6 0 Those levels, nevertheless, were recognized among
institutional investors (and, we may suppose, by the rating agencies themselves) to be
substantially below the most likely default rates in the event of a subsequent downturn.
Yet, since they were commonly accepted, the 2001-2003 rates provided a unique
opportunity for fund managers-and for loan originators, banks, and others who held
subprime assets-to purposely invest in higher-yielding but riskier investments and to
"plausib[ly] den[y]" their awareness of the risk of any later loss. 6 1 By contrast, in other
securitization products, investors typically focus on the identity of the asset originators,
portfolio composition, and the assets' past performance, with more realistic default rates

55. Engel & McCoy, supra note 52, at 2065-68; Gorton, supra note 36, at 29-31; Charles W. Calomiris,
The Subprime Turmoil. What's Old, What's New, and What's Next 26 (Am. Enter. Inst., Print No. 23,545,
2008), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081002 TheSubprimeTurmoil.pdf
56. For some loan originators, the corporate credit market has adopted a similar discipline. See infra notes
163-66 and accompanying text.
57. Calomiris, supra note 55, at 28-29.
58. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understandingthe Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
11 n.7 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Center, Working Paper No. 07-43, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract1071189.
59. Id. at 9-11.
60. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 52, at 2054-58 (describing various securitization techniques used to
minimize credit, prepayment, and litigation risk).
61. Calomiris, supra note 55, at 18-19, 26-31. The same pressure for profits prompted Chuck Prince, the
then-CEO of Citigroup, to famously remark, "So long as the music is playing, you've got to keep dancing.
We're still dancing." John Kay, Bankers, Like Gangs, Just Get CarriedAway, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 13,
2008, at 9.
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based upon a longer history of securitization than the understated levels used in the
62
subprime market.
Accordingly, while agency problems contributed to the subprime crisis and, more
generally, extended to other credit instruments as the private credit market became more
liquid, 6 3 significant differences between subprime and corporate loans suggest that the
agency problems that sparked the current crisis may not apply equally to corporate credit.
In addition, the development of alternative means to mitigate agency costs in the
corporate market may reflect the relative inability of market participants and institutional
investors to "plausibly" understate default levels. There are, nevertheless, lessons to be
learned from the subprime experience, and as I argue in this Article, those lessons are
likely to reinforce the trend towards greater liquidity in private credit instruments. 64
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II considers loan covenants, monitoring, and
liquidity within the traditional agency cost framing of the firm. Covenants and monitoring were presumed to be the least costly means to manage credit risk in light of the
limited ability of lenders, at the time the traditional framing was introduced, to buy and
sell loans and other credit instruments.
In Part III, I describe how the business of lending has evolved, resulting in change in
credit risk management and the creation of an increasingly liquid credit market. Private
credit may now offer lower cost alternatives to covenants and monitoring in managing
credit risk.
Part IV explores the impact of private credit liquidity on capital structure and
governance. Greater liquidity may increase the agency costs of lending, prompting new
means to minimize that cost and, by extension, changes in the governance function of
debt. Debt may, as a result, shift from a governance function based on private loans to a
greater reliance on liquid credit instruments. I also consider the implications of the
evolution of debt more generally for change in capital structure and corporate
governance.
In Part V, I describe some lessons to be learned from the current credit crisis.
Regulatory and market responses to the recent problems, I suggest, are likely to reinforce
the continued expansion of the private credit market. Part VI concludes.
II. COVENANTS, MONITORING,

AND LIQUIDITY

A central theme of this Article is that capital structure and corporate governance are
increasingly driven by completeness in the capital market. Covenants and monitoring,
within the standard framing, are presumed to be the least costly means for lenders to
mitigate credit risk-reflecting the traditional bank-borrower relationship at the time the
62. Calomiris, supra note 55, at 29-30.
63. In the case of corporate loans, for example, there was a significant decline in private equity loan
covenants in the year leading up to the credit slowdown, which-like in the subprime market-may have been
attributed to agency problems arising from the transfer of those loans in the secondary market. See infra notes
150-54 and accompanying text (noting a decline in commercial loan covenants beginning in 1995).
64. See infra notes 226-48 and accompanying text; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Complexity as a Catalyst
of Market Failure: A Law and Engineering Inquiry 5-30 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1240863 (discussing the negative effects of complex investment securities and
financial markets on market stability).
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agency cost construct was introduced. Subsequent changes in the lending business have
introduced the possibility of lower cost alternatives, prompting an evolution in the role of
debt within corporate governance.
Covenant levels, within the traditional framing, are set by reference to agency
costs. 65 The optimal level is determined by weighing the benefits of covenants against
the costs to monitor, implement, and enforce the terms of the loan contract. Overall, firms
choose to fund with debt so long as it is cheaper than the alternatives, such as public
66
equity.

Within that trade-off, the traditional construct distinguishes between public and
private debt. Public bonds are widely held and easily transferable, increasing their agency
costs-in part, through the collective action problem of dispersed ownership-but permitting holders to inexpensively diversify, manage, and transfer credit risk. The result is
typically less restrictive covenants in light of greater publicly available information about
those borrowers, the higher cost to monitor and enforce compliance, 67 and a decline in
68
the ability to mitigate credit risk through contract.
By contrast, private debt builds on the preexisting relationship between lenders and
borrowers. Lenders rely on that relationship to monitor and enforce covenants to address
credit risk, typically at lower cost than public debt holders. 69 Covenants, however, can be
expensive and imperfect predictors of management behavior, reflecting the ex ante difficulty of assessing a borrower's future performance. 70 Thus, in order to minimize their
costs, the risk that some covenants will limit profitable activity is offset by the ability,
among a small group of lenders, to inexpensively renegotiate covenants that have become
71
too restrictive, as well as to exercise control rights.
Delegating authority to an intermediary, such as a bank, may lower agency costs to
the extent the bank is better able to monitor and respond to change in a borrower's circumstances. 72 Those functions, however, can be managed just as well by a nonbank

65. References in this Article to "covenant levels" are to the number and restrictiveness of covenants in a
loan or other credit instrument.
66. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 342-51; Faulkender & Petersen, supra note 25, at 45-46;
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercialand CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 67 (1982).
67. For example, maintenance covenants, which are common in private bank loans, require the borrower
to meet its obligations on a regular basis; incurrence covenants, which are more frequent in public debt, are
triggered only upon occurrence of a specified event, such as a new borrowing, a dividend distribution, or an
acquisition. CAREY ET AL., supra note 3, at 11-12;. Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091, 1098-1101 (2002).
68. Amihud et al., supra note 2, at 450-51, 459-60, 462-65.
69. Kahan & Tuckman, supranote 7, at 7, 25-26.
70. Steven Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, Financing Constraints and Corporate
Investment, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 141, 151-52 (explaining the negative effects of
covenant restrictions on investment opportunities); Triantis & Daniels, supranote 9, at 1093-94.
71. CAREY ET AL., supra note 3, at 13-14, 36-38; Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt
Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 14 (1996) (predicting that higher default risk firms
prefer to borrow from fewer creditors); Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 150-51; Nicolae Grleanu & Jeffrey
Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STuD. 749-53 (2009) (finding that
covenants are tight at inception, but frequently relaxed upon renegotiation).
72. See Douglas W. Diamond, FinancialIntermediationand DelegatedMonitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD.
393, 393-95 (1984) [hereinafter Diamond, Intermediation] (developing a model in which a financial
intermediary has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending); Fama, supra note 13, at 36-38.
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intermediary, suggesting one reason for the decline in traditional banking in the face of
73
new lenders, products, and markets over the last 30 years.

Banks, nevertheless, remain an important source of capital. A key feature is their
ability to obtain quasi-public information about borrowers at lower cost than other
financial intermediaries. 74 Banks rely on monitoring and long-term relationships to
develop that information, without the cost of duplication across multiple lenders. 75 Consequently, borrowers for whom there is less publicly available information, but whose
managers are prepared to accept the greater oversight provided by bank monitors, 76 are
more likely to rely on banks than the public market.77

Covenant levels are determined, in part, by the amount of borrower information that
a lender possesses or can cheaply acquire. 78 If the lender is less well-informed, it is more
likely to seek stricter covenants in order to more closely control a borrower's future
activities. Accordingly, even in the case of public bonds, tighter covenants may be
necessary in order to offset the lower levels of information available about a less
transparent borrower. 79 Covenants, however, may not be as effective if they cannot be
monitored and enforced, potentially resulting in fewer covenants-and an increase in the
real cost of capital-if the lender is unable to do so inexpensively. 80 Thus, a bank's low-

cost ability to obtain information about borrowers and monitor compliance with loan
obligations creates a competitive advantage over other lenders.
Reputation may also play a role in setting covenant levels. A firm that repeatedly
accesses the credit market has an economic interest to develop a reputation as a "good"
borrower. If the borrower can benefit (for example, through fewer covenants or a lower
real cost of capital), then-even if not contractually obligated to do so-it has an
incentive to act in a manner consistent with the lender's interests. Lenders may, in turn,
begin to relax their reliance on covenants and monitoring in loans to borrowers with
81
established reputations.
73. See Eugene F. Fama, Banking in the Theory of Finance, 6 J. MONETARY ECON. 39, 41-42 (1980);
Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries Do? 1-2 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 99-30-B, 1999), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/99/9930.pdf
(describing the transformation of the U.S. banking industry).
74. Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 323-24 (1975);
Fama, supra note 13, at 35-39; Triantis & Daniels, supra note 9, at 1083-90.
75. An extensive survey of bank monitoring and loan structure appears in Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton,
Financial Intermediation, in IA HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 431, 462-89 (2003). See also
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1212-13, 1219-23 (2006) (describing the role of banks and covenants in the corporate
decisionmaking of firms in financial distress); Diamond, Intermediation, supra note 72, at 393-95.
76. Philip G. Berger et al., Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411,
1411-13 (1997).
77. CAREY ET AL., supra note 3, at 11; Fama, supra note 13, at 30; Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle,
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 384 (1977)
(noting that less risky firms have incentives to deal with intermediaries that are better able to sort risk).
78. David J. Denis & Vassil T. Mihov, The Choice Among Bank Debt, Non-Bank Private Debt, and Public
Debt: Evidence from New Corporate Borrowings, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6 (2003); Rajan & Winton, supra note 12,
at 1114-15; Gfirleanu & Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 752-53.
79. Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 122-24; Bradley & Roberts, supra note 6, at 2-3
80. Gfirleanu & Zwiebel, supra note 71, at 751-53; Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 7, at 6-7.
81. Amoud W.A. Boot, Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Reputation and Discretion in Financial
Contracting, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1165, 1165-67 (1993); Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation:
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To be sure, the traditional agency cost model considered the use of diversification to
manage risk and, in particular, its relationship to optimal capital structure. Portfolio
theory suggests that there should be a less costly means for banks to manage credit risk
than covenants and monitoring.8 2 Doing so effectively, however, required a liquid market
for the purchase and sale of credit, which did not exist at the time the agency cost framing
was introduced. 83 Thus, the benefits of diversification were presumed to be principally
limited to equity, with banks instead relying on contractual protections-such as
84
covenants and monitoring-to manage their credit exposure.
A bank's informational advantage also limited its ability to resell loans to investors,
suggesting one reason why a liquid credit market failed to develop before changes in the
lending business in the 1980s. 85 Less knowledgeable purchasers were likely to discount a
loan's value, or attempt to engage in their own costly monitoring of a borrower, resulting
in a decline in the price at which the loan could be sold. 86 Consequently, banks were
better off if they held the loans they originated until maturity, informing the historical
presumption that bank assets were unmarketable. 8 7 The inability to transfer loans, in turn,
88
reinforced the value to lenders of covenants and monitoring to manage credit risk.
The upshot was that covenants were costly-but, in light of the capital market of the
period, they were understood to be the least costly means to manage credit risk. Alternatives had not yet been introduced, in part due to the absence of a liquid credit market,
so that lenders placed greater reliance on covenants and monitoring, which limited
liquidity even further. Market participants looked to minimize the related cost by relying
on bank intermediaries and reputation.
In the next Part, I describe changes in the credit market that enabled banks to begin
to actively manage their credit exposure. The transformation of the lending business
broke the log jam between covenants and liquidity. The result was a shift in the costs and
benefits that shape capital structure, and a decline in the cost of managing credit risk,
The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 690-91, 716 (1991)
[hereinafter Diamond, Monitoring]; Kose John & David C. Nachman, Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and
Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 863, 864-65 (1985). The risk of relying on reputation in

place of traditional contractual protections is described infra at notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
82. Markowitz first demonstrated the benefits of portfolio diversification in 1952, for which he won the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
83. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 348-50 (applying a diversification analysis to shareholdings).
84. John B. Morgan, Managing a Loan Portfolio Like an Equity Fund,BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
28; Edward 1. Altman, Corporate Bond and Commercial Loan Portfolio Analysis 2-3, 12, 23 (Wharton Fin.

Inst. Center, Working Paper No. 96-41, 1996), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/96/9641 .pdf.
85. Those changes are described infra at notes 91-122 and accompanying text.
86. Diamond, Intermediation, supra note 72, at 410. The asymmetry resulted in the classic "lemons
problem" described in George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market

Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
87. See Amihud et al., supra note 2, at 466 (describing the credit behavior of private debt and public bond
holders); Levmore, supra note 66, at 70 (explaining the benefits of monitoring by creditors); Gary Gorton &
George Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Non-marketable Assets 1-3, 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Res., Working Paper No. 3551, 1990), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=226833
(examining the opening of loan sales markets during the 1980s).
88. See Black, supra note 74, at 329-30; PHILIP E. STRAHAN, BORROWER RISK AND THE PRICE AND NON-

PRICE TERMS OF BANK LOANS 2-8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 90, 1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=192769 (finding that banks adjust price and non-price terms to facilitate monitoring
and limit loan losses).
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beyond those presumed within the traditional framing of the firm,
III, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CREDIT MARKET

Managing credit risk lies at the heart of a bank's traditional function as an
intermediary between depositors and borrowers. 89 A key to that business model is a
bank's ability to balance the interests of investors in liquid liabilities (deposits) against its
borrowers' interests in longer-term, illiquid assets (loans), with loan portfolio risks spread
90
across depositors and over time.
The business of banking, and the role of banks as intermediaries, began to change in
the 1970s and 1980s, driven by increasing bank and nonbank competition, 9 1 product and
other innovation in the marketplace, 92 and changes in financial services regulation. 9 3 In
particular, the introduction of new regulatory capital requirements made it more
expensive for banks to continue the lending business as they had before 94-typically, in
the past, by assessing credit risk and borrower concentrations at the time a loan was made
and then holding that loan to its maturity. 95 Banks looked to offset the resulting decline

89. Bert Scholtens & Dick van Wensveen, A Critique on the Theory of FinancialIntermediation, 24 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1243, 1247-48 (2000) (noting that managing risk has always been "the bread and butter of
financial intermediaries").
90. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, FinancialMarkets, Intermediaries,and IntertemporalSmoothing,
105 J. POL. ECON. 523, 525 (1997) (discussing strategies to hedge nondiversifiable risk through intertemporal
smoothing); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banks Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 401, 405 (1983) (describing the banks' "role of turning illiquid assets into liquid assets"); Fama,
supra note 13, at 34-35. Since a bank's owners bear the residual risk of the lending business, depositors (and
others who free ride on the bank's oversight) can be assured of a credible screening and monitoring process.
Gary B. Gorton & Joseph G. Haubrich, Loan Sales, Recourse, and Reputation: An Analysis of Secondary Loan
Participations 14-15 (Rodney L. White Ctr. Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 14-87, 1987), available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctr/papers/8714.pdf. Deposit insurance and other subsidies, however, may
increase the risk of moral hazard by reducing the cost to banks and their owners of making risky loans. See
Rajeev Dehejia & Adriana Lleras-Muney, FinancialDevelopment and Pathways of Growth: State Branching
and Deposit Insurance Laws in the United States, 1900-1940, 50 J.L. & ECON. 239, 240 (2007) (analyzing the
negative effect of deposit insurance on aspects of U.S. financial development from 1900 to 1940).
91. See LOWELL L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER SIEGE 22-28
(1988) (discussing the effect of deposit deregulation on competition in the financial industry); KERRY COOPER
& DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 2-17
(1984) (discussing changes in depository institutions); Allen & Santomero, supra note 73, at 5-10 (discussing
differences among financial systems).
92. See Allen N. Berger, Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTWITY 55, 68-70
(describing the role of technological and financial innovation in transforming the banking industry); Allen &
Santomero, supra note 73, at 8-10.
93. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 91, at 195-217; ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,

WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 33-59 (1987); Berger et al., supra note 92, at 127.
94. See CHARLES SMITHSON ET AL., RESULTS FROM THE 2002 SURVEY OF CREDIT PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 5 (2002), availableat http://www.isdadocs.org/c and a/pdf/2002-cpm-survey.pdf
(noting that regulatory capital was a primary motivation to transfer loans); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your
Sign?-IntemationalNorms, Signals,and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 721-25 (2006) (describing the
impact of the Basel Accord on bank regulatory capital).
95. See JOHN B. CAOUETrE, EDWARD I. ALTMAN & PAUL NARAYANAN, MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE
NEXT GREAT FINANCIAL CHALLENGE 65 (1998); Altman, supra note 84, at 1.
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in profitability by increasing their credit exposure, 96 a trend that was boosted by the flight
of higher quality borrowers to the public capital market. 97 They also began to consider
new businesses, such as trading for their own account and selling new products and
services, which were more profitable than lending and not subject to the same levels of
credit risk. 98 In addition, competing products (such as money market funds) began to
offer attractive alternatives to bank deposits, so that banks could no longer count on
99
depositors to cushion against loan losses.
Driven by those changes, banks began to reassess the lending business-with many
turning to a defensive, portfolio-based strategy in order to minimize their overall credit
cost. 100 A bank's exposure was typically concentrated within the geography in which its
10 1
branches were located and among clients with which it had established relationships.
Diversifying that risk could result in a more balanced and profitable loan portfolio, for
example, by limiting the impact of an economic downturn in one region by trading loans
from that region for loans from another part of the country. Yet, actively managing
portfolio risk was, at the time, principally limited to equities, with credit risk instead
being transferred through traditional (and more costly) instruments like financial
guarantees and credit insurance. A liquid market to buy and sell credit risk, as well as the
creation of a measure of default risk and correlation across loans, was necessary in order
102
for portfolio risk management to be extended to debt.
The banking industry responded. New technologies were developed to measure risk
and diversification across loan portfolios--enabling banks to assess loans on a credit-bycredit basis and decide which assets to buy and sell, and at what price, in order to
optimize a loan portfolio's return-to-risk relationship. 103 Banks also became less

96. See JAMES R. BARTH, R. DAN BRUMBAUGH, JR. & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
BANKING 18 (1992); David T. Llewellyn, Banking in the 21st Century: The Transformation of an Industry, in
THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 141, 142-43, 152-53 (Malcom Edey ed., 1996); Allen & Santomero,
supranote 73, at 5-9. But see Patricia Jackson et al., CapitalRequirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of
the Basle Accord 20-21 (Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbswpOl .pdf (arguing that there is no reliable evidence on the impact of regulatory
capital requirements on bank isk-taking).
97. JAMES L. PIERCE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 64 (1991); Gorton &
Haubrich, supranote 90, at 14-15.
98. Allen & Santomero, supra note 73, at 8-10 (describing the banks' shift from traditional intermediation
to fee-producing activities).
99. Robert DeYoung & William C. Hunter, Deregulation, the Internet, and the Competitive Viability of
Large Banks and Community Banks, in THE FUTURE OF BANKING 173, 178-79 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2003);
Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 239-42 (describing the decline in bank profits as depositors shifted funds to the
capital markets).
100. See Allen & Gale, supra note 90, at 538-41; Allen & Santomero, supra note 73, at 17, 21 (relating the
banks' abandonment of temporal risk-smoothing strategies in favor of fee revenues in response to financial
market competition); Berger et al., supranote 92, at 68-69, 80-81.
101. See CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 95, at 31-32; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment
Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 985, 989-90 (1993) (describing the traditional limitations on banks' influence over corporate governance).
102. See CAOUETrE ET AL., supra note 95, at 231-42, 267-72; Paul Bennett, Applying Portfolio Theory to
Global Bank Lending, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 153, 156-57 (1984) (noting that the measurement of covariances
across different borrowers is key for efficient portfolio construction).
103. By 2002, a credit portfolio model developed by KMV, LLC, a quantitative risk management firm
founded in 1989, had become the most widely used in the banking industry. See Derivatives Strategy.com, 2000
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interested in holding loans to their maturity in light of the growing ability to enhance
returns by selling loan interests to others. 104 Thus, costs traditionally tied to the resale of
loans were offset by the real benefits of managing credit risk. Greater competition among
lenders also made long-term relationships with borrowers less valuable. 105 The result was
a shift in the lending business, as banks moved from their traditional role as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers to become brokers who originated and sold
loans to others. 106 Banks also began to more actively buy and sell loans and other credit

instruments in order to better manage their credit exposure. 107
The loan sales market-principally comprised of a syndicated loan market and a
secondary trading market-developed in response, in terms of both aggregate size 10 8 and
the universe of investors. 10 9 The leveraged buyout wave of the mid-1980s prompted the
growth of syndicated loans as a lower cost means to raise debt capital, as well as the
creation of a secondary market for the trading of loans. 110 In a syndicated loan, one or
more "lead banks" negotiate the terms of the loan with the borrower and sell portions to
others at the time of origination. 1 1 Interests in a loan, whether or not syndicated, can
also be sold in the secondary market, which is dominated by riskier borrowers and nonHall of Fame, http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive/2000/0300feal.asp (last visited Feb. 3,
2009); SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 94, at 6-7. The KMV model is described in STEPHEN KEALHOFER &
JEFFREY R. BOHN, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT OF DEFAULT RISK 2 (2001), available at
http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/whitepaper/Portfolio-Management-ofDefault-Risk.pdf. Other methods
have also been developed to measure a loan portfolio's risk and return characteristics. See CAOUETTE ET AL.,
supra note 95, at 285-99.
104. See PIERCE, supra note 97, at 84-85 (noting that banks have abandoned their role as intermediaries in
favor of selling mortgage loans to others); Allen & Santomero, supra note 73, at 7-10; Llewellyn, supra note
96, at 164, 169; Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 317-27, 435-36.
105. See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON. 407, 407-08 (1995) (analyzing the negative impact of competition on the
formation of creditor-borrower relationships).
106. See CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 341 (2000)
(noting that, during the 1980s, some banks moved away from their traditional role as intermediaries to a
business model focused on relationship building); Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank
Debt: CapitalStructure and FinancialMarket Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL. ECON.
324, 326-27 (2000) (describing the banks' motivation to securitize loans); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in
Transition-FromBoom to Bust and Into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR, L.J. 375, 379 (2007) (describing the shift
in bank holdings, comprising over 70% of loans in 1995 to below 13% by 2007).
107. See MORTAN GLANTZ, MANAGING BANK RISK: AN INTRODUCTION TO BROAD-BASE CREDIT ENGINEERING 423-49 (2003); Bennett, supranote 102, at 156-59.
108. The market for syndicated loans grew from $137 million in 1987 to over $1 trillion today. Sufi, supra
note 3, at 629. Loan trading also grew from $8 billion in 1991 to $238.6 billion in 2006. Steven Drucker &
Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting,and Lending Relationships, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 1 (2008).
109. Investors now include pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, specialty finance companies,
and foreign institutions. Joseph G. Haubrich & James B. Thomson, The Evolving Loan Sales Market, ECON.
COMMENT (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Ohio), July 15, 1993 at 3, available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/1993/0715.pdf; LORI B. APPELBAUM ET AL., GOLDMAN,
SACHS & Co., GLOBAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH: RISING LBO BANK LOAN RISK, BANKS HOLDING LITTLE OF IT
3-5 (2007).
110. A description of the growth of the leveraged loan market appears in Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking
FinanceSeriously: How Debt FinancingDistorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1975, 2011-20 (2008).
111. GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, THE U.S. LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A PRIMER 14-22
(2004), available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_.primerI 004.pdf.
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bank investors. 112 Bank lenders, therefore, can transfer loans at the time of origination, as
well as sell all or part of a loan at a later date. The new liquidity enabled banks to minimize credit cost by diversifying their exposure across a range of borrowers; 113 and banks
that participated in the loan market could hold less capital against riskier loans and more
profitable loan portfolios.

114

The credit derivatives market also grew, 115 partly in response to the increased
demand for instruments to help lenders manage their credit exposure 116 and minimize
their cost of complying with regulatory capital requirements. 117 Credit derivatives
separate the funding obligation of a loan or bond from the credit risk of the borrower.

Thus, using a credit default swap, a bank can buy or sell all or a portion of a borrower's
credit risk without transferring the loan or bond itself, enabling it to more efficiently
manage and diversify exposure and expanding the universe of prospective investors
beyond those with significant amounts of capital to lend. 118 Since the credit derivatives
market is largely private, and since some borrowers are reluctant to see interests in their
loans sold to others, it is unclear how often lenders use derivatives to hedge their credit
risk. However, total volumes have continued to grow, and there are indications that their

112. YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 11l, at 23-28, 35-37; William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens:
Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1585-90 (2004);
Drucker & Puri, supra note 108, at 1-2. A description of the syndicated loan market, and how it differs from the
secondary trading market, can be found at Sufi, supra note 3, at 632-34.
113. Greater liquidity, for example, resulted in increased diversification among leveraged loan investors
who, on average, committed only $5 million to a single deal during the most recent private equity wave.
Appelbaum et al., supra note 109, at 3-5; Serena Ng & Henry Sender, Easy Money: Beyond Buyout Surge, A
Debt Market Booms-CLOs Spark Worries of Volatility and Risk, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007, at Al.
114. A. Sinan Cebenoyan & Philip E. Strahan, Risk Management, CapitalStructure and Lending at Banks,
28 J. BANKING & FIN. 19, 38 (2004).
115. The global credit derivatives market was estimated in 1996 to be $180 billion in notional amount.
Ross BARRETT & JOHN EWAN, BBA CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT 2006, at 5 (2006), available at
http://www.bba.org.uk/content/l/c4/76/71/Creditderivative-report_2006 exec summary.pdf. A decade later,
between 2004 and 2007, more than $210 billion in collateralized loan obligations were issued (up from $51
billion over the preceding four years); and by the end of 2007, an estimated $62 trillion in notional amount of
credit default swaps were traded (up from $632 billion in 2001). DAVID MENGLE, INT'L SWAP & DERIVATIVES
ASS'N, INC., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA FINANCIAL MARKETS CONFERENCE-CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: AN OVERVIEW 11 (2007), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/07fmc/
07FMC menglepresent.pdf; Gretchen Morgenson, First Comes the Swap. Then It's the Knives., N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2008, at BU1. A description of credit derivative instruments appears in GLANTZ, supra note 107, at
531-49; Blythe Masters & Kelly Bryson, Credit Derivatives and Loan Portfolio Management, in HANDBOOK
OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 43-85 (Jack Clark Francis et al. eds., 1999).
116. See MENGLE, supra note 115, at 2 (describing the use of credit derivatives to manage risk); Bernadette
Minton, Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, How Much do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Reduce Risk? 3-5
(Ohio State Univ., Fisher Coll. Of Bus., Working Paper No. 2006-03-001, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=785364.
117. See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the CapitalMarkets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance
and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 175 (2007) (describing the function and
use of credit default swaps). The market also grew as a result of trading, unrelated to hedging, by banks and
other institutions for their own accounts and for clients. See Duffle, supra note 16, at 4-5.
118. CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 95, at 311-12; GLANTZ, supra note 107, at 532; Angus Duncan, LoanOnly Credit Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity, COM. LENDING REV., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 16; Minton et al.,
supra note 116, at 7.
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use to diversify credit risk is becoming more common.] 19
Of particular importance to the loan market was the creation of collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs)-often structured by a sponsoring bank (typically, the originator of a
loan pool), which sold a loan portfolio to a special purpose vehicle that, in turn, issued
multiple tranches of CLO securities to investors in order to fund the purchase. 120 The
ability to convert loan assets into securities, and then transfer an undivided interest in
those assets through the capital market, enhanced their liquidity. 12 1 By 2005, almost one122
half of all commercial loans were bought by CLOs.
For banks, the benefits have been substantial 12 3-- enabling them to manage and
diversify credit risk at lower cost,124 capitalize on their ability to originate loans for sale
to investors who can finance them at lower cost,'125 and realize greater returns on the
loans they retain. 126 Borrowers have benefited as well. A portion of the gains realized by
banks can be passed on, for example, through increased lending limits or lower interest
27
rates, resulting in an overall decline in a borrower's real cost of capital. 1
None of those benefits could be duplicated, at low cost, by a bank's or borrower's
shareholders, providing value-maximizing managers with an incentive to continue to
support and grow the credit market. 128 Further innovation resulted in new and less costly

119. See DEBTWIRE, NORTH AMERICAN DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2008, at 14 (2008),
available at http://www.debtwire.com/library.marketview?DoclD=1083; Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C.
Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110, 137 (2007); Hu & Black, supra note 26,
at 682-83; Partnoy & Skeel, supranote 18, at 1034; Duffie, supra note 16, at 4-5.
120. Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Casefor Distressed Investor Presence in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191, 233-34; see also infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
121. See Tamar Frankel, Securitization: The Conflict Between Personaland Property Law (Contract and
Property), 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 197-98, 218-19 (1999) (describing the transformation of personal
contract (loans) into market-traded property (securities) through securitization).
122. Laurie S. Goodman, Douglas J. Lucas & Frank J. Fabozzi, FinancialInnovations and the Shaping of
Capital Markets: The Case of CDOs, J. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, Summer 2007, at 62, 63; see also infra
notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
123. Those benefits are described in more detail in Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Securitization,
Risk, and the Liquidity Problem in Banking, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 227, 238-46 (Michael
Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993), and Pennacchi, supra note 29, at 375-76.
124. See REBECCA S. DEMSETZ, BANK LOAN SALES: A NEW LOOK AT THE MOTIVATIONS FOR SECONDARY
MARKET ACTIVITY 22-23 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 69, 1999), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr69.pdf; Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?,
NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45, 45-47 (discussing the advantages of diversification through
syndication).
125. DEMSETZ, supra note 124, at 20-22; Bolton & Freixas, supra note 106, at 326-27 (discussing gains in
lending efficiency from securitization); Christopher James, The Use of Loan Sales and Standby Letters of Credit
by Commercial Banks, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 395, 396 (1988); Pennacchi, supra note 29, at 375-76, 392-93;
Jackson et al., supranote 96, at 21-26.
126. See Masters & Bryson, supra note 115, at 57-63 (discussing the improved risk-retum tradeoffs in
concentrated lending activity); Mark Carey, Credit Risk in PrivateDebt Portfolios,53 J. FIN. 1363, 1377 (1998);
Cebenoyan & Strahan, supra note 114, at 20-21.
127. A. Burak Goner, Loan Sales and the Cost of CorporateBorrowing, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 687, 713
(2006); Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Bank Capitalizationand Cost: Evidence of Scale Economies in
Risk Management and Signaling, 80 REV. ECON. & STATS. 314, 325 (1998); Pennacchi, supra note 29, at 37576.
128. Gilson & Whitehead, supranote 16, at 250-5 1.
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129
hedging instruments, with greater standardization in the loan and derivatives markets
reducing transaction costs and supporting growth of the credit market across a greater
30
number of participants. 1
Among those participants, bank lenders could be expected to transfer credit risk
until the cost of doing so exceeded the offsetting benefit, suggesting the potential for
13 1
Yet, to date, the
growth in the credit market across a wide range of participants.
132
which may
market has remained concentrated among a small group of large banks,

reflect real barriers to entry-the need for reputation in order to syndicate loans or
economies of scale in order to efficiently manage risk, 133 or in the case of the credit
default swap market, the limited number of reference entities against which swaps are
134
Fund managers and other
written, making that market less relevant to small lenders.

institutional investors, however, expect to increase their use of credit and other
derivatives to hedge risk, even as they move to less complicated instruments they are
better able to price and manage.

13 5

In addition, some dealers have indicated that local and

regional banks may be a primary source of new business, prompting the creation36 of a
wider array of credit default swaps in order to hedge their portfolio concentrations. 1

129. See Christopher L. Culp & Andrea M.P. Neves, FinancialInnovations in Leveraged CommercialLoan
Markets, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 79, 83-91 (1998) (describing innovation and standardization in leveraged
loan instruments); see also Press Release, Chicago Bd. of Trade, CBOT to Launch Credit Default Swap Index
Contracts (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont detail/0,3206,1562+48264,00.html
(announcing standardized credit default swap index for trading on the Chicago Board of Trade).
130. See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of FinancialSystems: Towards a Synthesis of Function
and Structure, 3 J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 1, 14 (2005) (referring to a "financial innovation spiral").
13 1. See Kenneth A. Froot & Jeremy C. Stein, Risk Management, CapitalBudgeting, and CapitalStructure
Policy for FinancialInstitutions: An Integrated Approach, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 55, 77 (1998) (discussing risk
management strategies for banks to maximize value through hedging and risk valuation); Kenneth A. Froot,
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Risk Management: CoordinatingCorporateInvestment and Financing
Policies,48 J. FIN. 1629, 1630 (1993) (discussing the effects of hedging on cash flow variability).
132. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 380-81 (discussing loan syndications); Minton et al., supra note 116, at
2-4, 7 (discussing credit derivatives). Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that many European banks use
credit default swaps to hedge their credit exposure. Benedikt Goderis et al., Bank Behaviour with Access to
Credit Risk Transfer Markets 9 n.l (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2007, 2007), available at
http://www.bof.ft/NR/rdonlyresl801 B7C28-819B-4A72-877A-0926F00563D 1/0/0704netti.pdf.
133. See BEVERLY HIRTLE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND BANK CREDIT SUPPLY 2-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y. Staff Report No. 276, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr276.pdf
(finding that the benefits of credit derivatives accrue mainly to large finns); Hughes & Mester, supra note 127,
at 314-15 (discussing the positive effects of economies of scale on portfolio diversification and the cost of
capital); Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 380 (discussing loan syndicates).
134. See Goderis et al., supra note 132, at 8-9 (discussing how the number of reference entities affects
credit risk management). Notwithstanding a recent decline in overall credit default swap volume, single-name
contracts have continued to grow. Through the first half of 2008, the total notional amount of credit default
swaps rose to $33.3 trillion. BANK FOR INT'L SETFLEMENTS, MONETARY AND ECON. DEP'T, OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publlotc_
hy0811 .pdf.
135. KPMG, BEYOND THE CREDIT CRISIS: THE IMPACT AND LESSONS LEARNT FOR INVESTMENT
MANAGERS 7-10, 17-18, 29-30 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Beyond the credit crisis.pdf (discussing the results of a global survey following the credit slowdown of 333
fund managers and institutional investors).
136. Gregory R. Duffee & Chunsheng Zhou, Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for Managing
Risk?, 48 J. MONETARY ECON. 25, 30 (2001).
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A further hurdle to growth remains-namely, the informational asymmetry that has
historically given banks a competitive edge over nonbank lenders. Like purchasers in the
traditional loan market, investors may be reluctant to trade, or do so only at a discount,
where they believe they are at an informational disadvantage. 137 Thus, with respect to
credit derivatives, the underlying assets historically have tended to be limited to
instruments like corporate bonds, large bank loans, and loan pools (such as credit card
receivables), with less transparent borrowers often not covered. 138 Some information
may be conveyed to less-informed investors through the price and non-price terms under
which banks buy and sell loans and other credit instruments. 139 Yet, the extent to which
an informed bank (or other investor) participates in the market, and the prices at which it
buys and sells instruments, may not be apparent to others. And, as evidenced by the
recent credit downturn, those instruments may be difficult to value, potentially increasing
the noise around any useful information contained in market price. 140 Greater regulation,
a centralized pricing service, and the requirement of enhanced transparency, proposed by
14 1
some, may provide one solution.
The credit market, itself, may also respond. Trading among even a small group of
informed investors (such as two banks) can result in the public release of a substantial
amount of private information through competitive pricing. Others can then rely on that
information to make their own investment decisions, resulting in an overall increase in
market size. 1 42 A further possibility is that greater and more diverse information will be
reflected in market price as more participants, with sufficient resources to devote to
researching credit instruments, enter the market 1 43-perhaps providing one reason for the
recent expansion of credit derivatives to leveraged and other commercial loans 144 and to

137. See Acharya & Johnson, supra note 119, at 111-13 (discussing how insider information can affect
investors' decisionmaking).
138. Duffee & Zhou, supra note 136, at 26.
139. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 18, at 1026 (noting that credit ratings are an important indicator of
stability); Antonio Nicol6 & Loriana Pelizzon, Credit Derivatives, Capital Requirements and Opaque OTC
Markets 2-3 (Mar. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l 108253 (noting
that banks can signal a low probability of loss by accepting loss exposure).
140. See Sanjiv R. Das, Pricing Credit Derivatives, in HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 101, 104-05
(Jack Clark Francis et al. eds., 1999) (describing the difficulties of modeling credit risk).
141. See infra notes 230-47 and accompanying text; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supranote 18, at 1046-47
(advocating public disclosure); Hu & Black, supra note 26, at 689-90, 693-94 (stating that "disclosure will let
market participants decide which counterparts to trust"); ASHCRAFT & SANTOS, supra note 28, at 26 (suggesting
that regulators require the lead bank in a syndicate to disclose any hedges of retained positions to outside
investors); COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYST., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND
LEVERAGED FINANCE MARKETS 36 (CGFS Paper No. 30, 2008) [hereinafter BIS, PRIVATE EQUITY], available
at http://www.bis.org/publcgfs30.pdfnoframes=l (recommending enhanced borrower disclosure in leveraged
loan markets).
142. See Craig W. Holden & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect
Competition,47 J. FIN. 247, 247-48 (1992) (demonstrating that just two informed traders, acting aggressively,
will cause nearly all common private information to be incorporated into pricing and increase market depth).
143. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directorsin the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1561-63 (2007) (describing how the increase in
market participants enhanced the informational content of stock prices).
144. See Duncan, supra note 118, at 16 (discussing the emergence of loan-only credit default swaps for
syndicated loans).
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less transparent borrowers with below investment grade or no ratings. 14 5 In addition,
investors can bypass the informational problem altogether by structuring credit
instruments to transfer only that portion of a borrower's credit risk over which they do
not have an informational advantage (such as risk related to a publicly disclosed project),
while retaining the rest. Doing so permits them to hedge their credit exposure more
discretely than if they tried to transfer a loan in its entirety-potentially expanding the
scope of the derivatives market beyond the current universe of tradable reference
entities. 14 6 Consequently, even without regulation, access to information may continue to
grow, or credit instruments may adjust to address the asymmetry, resulting in further
expansion of the private credit market.
In the next Part, I consider the impact of change in the credit market-the introduction of portfolio risk management, greater liquidity, and new instruments-on the
structure and function of debt. Greater liquidity in the credit market has introduced lower
cost alternatives to manage credit risk-but, as we will see, it has also introduced new
costs and new means to manage those costs, potentially reshaping the role that debt plays
within corporate governance. To what extent will liquidity in the private credit market
impact how loans are structured? And, like public equity, can the private credit market
begin to provide a discipline that supplements the traditional protections provided by
covenants and monitoring? We must, I suggest, begin to confront the possibility that as
private credit becomes more transparent it may begin to overtake the traditional function
of covenants and monitoring.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEBT
The growth of credit derivatives, some have argued, raises the potential for a decline
in debt governance as lenders rely on those instruments, in place of monitoring, to
manage their credit risk. 14 7 Likewise, covenant levels may decline if loan purchasers are
unable at low cost, or have little incentive, to monitor a borrower's compliance with its
loan obligations or to renegotiate a loan following its breach. As recent experience
suggests, notwithstanding differences between subprime and corporate lending, the
transfer of credit risk by loan originators may increase the risk of moral hazard. 148 Like
public bonds, the outcome may reflect a trade-off-with the lower cost of managing
credit risk through loan sales and hedging balanced against the increased cost arising
149
from weaker covenants and less creditor oversight.
That description, on its face, is consistent with the decline in commercial loan covenants that began in 1995. For over a decade, federal bank regulators cautioned banks
145. See

BANK

FOR

INT'L SETTLEMENTS,

CREDIT

DEFAULT SWAPS

SINGLE

NAME INSTRUMENTS,

NOTIONAL AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING AT END OF JUNE 2008 (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/

otcder/dt23.pdf (finding that the notional amount of credit default swaps outstanding for below investment
grade and non-rated debt exceeded $9 billion).
146. See Duffee & Zhou, supra note 136, at 26-27 (arguing that flexibility in repackaging risks can open up
the trading of previously untradeable credit risks).
147. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (noting the effects of decoupling economic and control
rights).
148. See supranotes 36--64 and accompanying text (discussing the current subprime crisis).
149. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing obligations arising under different types of
covenants).
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against weakening covenants in syndicated loans to risky borrowers. 150 Covenants
tightened as the U.S. markets entered a recessionary period in 2001-2002, but by 2006,
lending standards had eased considerably to the earlier, lower levels. 151 Before the
subprime loan meltdown in 2007, private equity sponsors saw a substantial rise in
"covenant-lite" (or "cov-lite") loans-which, as the name suggests, had substantially
fewer covenants than most commercial loans1 52-jumping from four in 2005 to over 100
in 2007.153 Market participants attributed a portion of the decline in covenant levels to
the increased ability to hedge risk in the credit market and the weakening incentives of
154
banks to screen and monitor borrowers.
Thus, greater liquidity may have resulted in a new set of agency costs, reflected in
the decline in covenants and monitoring across dispersed creditors. Those costs are
similar to costs in the public credit market, but with a critical difference-unlike firms
that typically access the public market, information regarding private borrowers is often
less well known. No doubt, some portion of the increased agency cost was offset by the
investors' ability to manage credit risk at lower cost through loan sales, hedging, and
diversification. Yet, even then, investors require information about borrowers, and look
to minimize moral hazard and adverse selection, in order to optimize risk and return
55
across a loan portfolio. 1
Not surprisingly, most loan buyers expect monitoring to decline after a loan has
been sold, 156 and we may suppose they will anticipate a similar decline in monitoring as
hedging becomes more common. 157 Investors may respond by demanding higher returns
in order to compensate them for the greater risk-a result that would be consistent with
the decline in governance, but unlikely to be sustained if there are less costly means to
mitigate the increase in agency costs associated with greater liquidity. 158 How that

150. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 384 (noting that regulators "admonished large banks for their
underwriting of risky syndicated loans").
151. WILLIAM MAY & MARIAROSA VERDE, FITCH RATINGS, LOAN VOLUMES SURGE, COVENANTS SHRINK
IN 2005, at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2006) (tracking loan covenants for investment grade and noninvestment grade

syndicated loan borrowers over the ten-year period through 2005).
152. See William D. Egler, Leveraged Financeand the Bank Lawyer, BANK LOAN REP., June 11, 2007, at 4
(noting that cov-lite loans rely on a basic leverage ratio test); Chris Howard & Christopher Davis, Seeing the
Lite, LAWYER, June 11, 2007, at 3 (comparing cov-lite loans and conventional LBO facilities).
153. Carol J. Clouse, The Structure Du Jour, or is Covenant Lite Here to Stay?, LEVERAGED FIN. NEWS,
May 21, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.leveragedfinancenews.com/blog/155852-l.htm; APPELBAUM ET
AL., supra note 109, at 3.
154. See Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks & Henri Servaes, PrivateEquity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 44, 46 (2007); Tony Jackson, The Wonders of Life in the Rear-View Mirror,FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 12, 2007, at 20, available at http://www.fl.com/cms/s/0/760fad36-dO3e-I ldb-94-cb-000b5df10621.html;
John Plender, Markets Versus the Conventional Wisdom in 2007, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 1, 2007, at 16,
availableat http://us.ft.com/flgateway/superpage.lnewsid=fto010120071454249463&page=2.
155. See ASHCRAFT & SANTOS, supra note 28, at 20 (discussing the type of information gathered by
investors to optimize expected returns).
156. See Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 90, at 31 (discussing the risks and problems associated with
monitoring loans).
157. See ASHCRAFT & SANTOS, supra note 28, at 25 (noting the increase in agency costs as lead banks
hedge their exposure to the retained portion of a syndicated loan).
158. As Fischer Black has observed, "If there is a way to limit the risk to the lender without significant cost,
a correctly priced high risk loan with few restrictions may be better for the company than a correctly priced low
risk loan with many restrictions and a high administrative cost." Black, supra note 74, at 331.
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balance tips is a function, in part, of the amount of borrower information available to
market participants. More transparent borrowers may require lower levels of monitoring
at lower cost than opaque firms. 159 The outcome also reflects the relative cost of
alternative means of raising capital. The ability to inexpensively raise funds can provide
lenders and borrowers with a competitive advantage over others who must incur greater
cost. Consequently, market participants have looked to minimize agency costs by
changing how loans and loan syndicates are structured-and, by extension, shaping new
forms of corporate governance. 160
I begin by describing those changes below, and then turn to a prospective change in
the private credit market that may provide an even lower cost alternative. A key has been
the response of the private credit market to change in the source of capital, as providers
have shifted from bank lenders, within the traditional framing, to bank and nonbank
investors in an increasingly liquid credit market. Features aimed at mitigating agency
costs have evolved in line with growth in the credit market and the corresponding change
in agency problems.
A. Syndicate Structure and Lead Bank Incentives
At the outset, syndicate structure can be modified to help minimize agency costs.
The number of lenders in a syndicate can be capped and resales can be restricted in order
to encourage direct monitoring and facilitate renegotiation if a loan covenant is
breached. 16 1 Participants in the original syndicate are more likely than later purchasers to
have relationships with the borrower and syndicate manager, enabling them to acquire
borrower information at low cost and facilitate coordination. 162 Thus, a lead bank's
monitoring role may be replaced with direct oversight by syndicate members.
In addition, as a condition of sale, a purchaser can require the lead bank to continue
to hold a portion of the loan until it matures. 163 By retaining economic risk, the bank can
credibly commit to continue monitoring and, as necessary, enforce a loan's covenants. 164
The risk that a lead bank will covertly hedge its risk, and so reduce its incentive to
the risk of loss of reputation 165 or new
monitor a borrower, may be checked through
66
1
regulation that requires greater transparency.
159. See ASHCRAFT & SANTOS, supra note 28, at 5-6, 19-20 (discussing how the credit default swap
market may affect the costs of monitoring for different types of firms).
160. See Pennacchi, supra note 29, at 387-88 (noting how loan structures can be modified to alter the level
of agency costs).
161. See Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, FinancialDistress, and the Structure of
Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 109 (2004) (summarizing recent literature on loan
syndication); DEMSETZ, supra note 124, at 28-30 (highlighting the effect of affiliate relationships).
162. See Sufi, supra note 3, at 630-32 (discussing the impact of information asymmetry on costs and
coordination).
163. See Diamond, Intermediation, supra note 72, at 393-95 (describing the benefits of delegating
monitoring to a financial intermediary); Simons, supra note 124, at 47-49 & tbls.l & 3 (finding that, on
average, lead banks retain a third of a syndicated loan and tend to retain a larger share of the lowest quality
loans).
164. See Pennacchi, supra note 29, at 387-88; Sufi, supra note 3, at 631; Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note
87, at 23, 28-29; Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 90, at 20-21.
165. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
166. See ASHCRAFT & SANTOS, supranote 28, at 26 (contemplating that regulators may require lead banks
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Finally, even without retaining risk, a lender may be able to demonstrate
mitment to monitoring if, as is often the case, it has other credit relationships
borrower that continue to motivate oversight. 167 Those relationships, however,
be credible since they, themselves, may result in conflict between the economic
16 8
of loan purchasers and the originating lender.

its comwith the
may not
interests

B. Covenant Levels andMonitoring
Covenants can also be structured to reflect change in the credit market. A recent
study of the secondary loan sales market, by Steven Drucker and Manju Puri, provides
interesting insight. The study, which analyzed a sample of loans from January 1999
through December 2004, found that nonsyndicated loans structured for resale (typically
leveraged, risky loans to nonbank, institutional investors) contained higher covenant
levels than loans that were not. 169 Those covenants were often tied to observable public
information, providing investors with the right to directly accelerate or renegotiate a loan
170
upon breach.
Why did covenant levels increase with the growth in liquidity? After all, greater
liquidity in the public market has typically been accompanied by a decline in covenants
and monitoring. Part of the answer lies with the borrowers. Information about private
borrowers tends to be less available than for public issuers, reinforcing the need to rely on
covenants. Covenant levels increased in order to offset the greater monitoring costs tied
to more opaque firms. For borrowers, the cost of tighter covenants was offset, in part, by
a greater ability to access capital at lower cost. 171
Part of the answer also lies with a change in the lenders. Nonbank investors typically
do not have the close ties with a borrower traditionally maintained by banks.
Consequently, by tightening covenant levels, more discrete changes in a borrower's
financial position could become known more quickly to investors, in effect increasing
their informational content. In addition, by tying covenants to more observable data,
purchasers could mitigate the increased cost of direct monitoring. 172 Investors, as a
result, were better able to manage credit risk and provide greater funding for additional

to disclose any hedges of retained positions); Alan D. Morrison, Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation,and
Investment Decisions, 78 J. Bus. 621, 642 (2005) (discussing a proposal to require the disclosure of credit
derivative trades); see also supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing the historic lack of
transparency in the loan market).
167. See Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 90, at 37 (finding that banks often sell the front end of a longer
loan or commitment, maintaining continued credit exposure to the borrower).
168. See Hu & Black, supra note 26, at 682 (discussing the effects of hedging on a creditor's decision to
exercise control rights).
169. Drucker & Puri, supra note 108, at 1-3. Those loans were primarily to smaller borrowers that were
less likely to be rated and arranged by lead lenders that were ranked below tenth based on market share. Id. at
8-12.
170. Id. at 2, 5, 14, 28.
171. Id.at2l-28.
172. Advances in information technology may lower that cost even further. See William J. Wilhelm, Jr.,
Internet Investment Banking: The Impact of Information Technology on Relationship Banking, 12 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 21, 26-27 (1999) (discussing how the relationship between investment bankers and institutional
investors decreases as information technology increases).
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loans in the future.
Increasing liquidity, and the change in lenders, also prompted the rise of specialist
funds and other (sometimes referred to as "vulture") investors that look to influence a
firm's management through its debt covenants. 1 74 Loans purchased by those investors are
often distressed, with the discount in purchase price (and potential for substantial return)
offsetting the greater cost of monitoring. 175 Investors use the borrower's breach of its
covenants to force change in its policies or a change in control 1 76-providing another
pair of eyes over distressed borrowers, where the potential for management opportunism
is the greatest.

177

C. Reputation

Reputation can also mitigate agency costs. For investors, how a bank structures a
loan or monitors a borrower may not be apparent at the time a loan is sold. The

purchaser, instead, must rely on the lender's reputation based on prior sales. Structuring a
bad loan, or failing to monitor a borrower, may hurt that reputation-and so, as long as
loan sales are a significant part of its business, concerns over reputation may induce an
originating bank to continue to monitor a borrower, even after its credit risk has been

transferred. 178 Transferring credit risk secretly, while possible, exposes the bank to a
potential loss of reputation and the risk of a costly decline in its ability to sell loans in the
future.

17 9

A borrower's reputation can also play an important role-in particular, for investors
who have costly or limited access to information about the borrower-as it does in the
traditional framing. A reputable borrower is typically able to obtain loans with fewer
173. Drucker & Puri, supranote 108, at 24-32.
174. See Corinne Ball, Credit Crisis Enables Bold Strikes by Investors, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2008, at 5,
6
4
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/inc/PubArticleltte.jsp?id=12024225 181 (describing how the credit crisis
has exposed firm weaknesses that investors can exploit).
175. See Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of
DistressedFirms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 403-04 (1997); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governanceand CorporateControl, 155 U. PENN. L. REv. 1021, 1064-66 (2007).
176. See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors'
Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 69, 89-92, 95 (2008) (describing debt investors' willingness to exert
control over debtors to achieve investment objectives).
177. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing the role of covenants in controlling
management opportunism).
178. The potential impact of securitization on a bank's reputation, and the resulting effect of a negative
reputation on its ability to transfer assets or raise capital, was highlighted by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency in the OCC Bulletin on Securitization. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC
BULLETIN No. 96-52, SECURITIZATION (1996); see also Dianna Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring,
Loan Renegotiability, and Firm Value: The Role of Lending Syndicates, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 577, 580-81
(1996); Raghuram G. Rajan, The Past and Future of Commercial Banking Viewed Through an Incomplete
ContractLens, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 524, 540 (1998); Haig Simonian & Peter Thai Larsen, UBS
Says Risky Loans Might Hit Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), June 20, 2007, at 25 (UBS chief warns of the potential
damage to reputation of originating risky loans); Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 90, at 35-38.
179. See Drucker & Puri, supra note 108, at 22-24 (describing the impact of lender reputation on loan
salability). J.P. Morgan's concern that banking rivals would learn of its use of credit default swaps to limit
exposure to WorldCom provides an example of the potential reputational impact of an originating bank's
decision to secretly reduce credit exposure. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 651-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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restrictions than a borrower with a lesser known credit history. 180 Investors may also be
less concerned with the lead bank's transfer of credit risk and, on the basis of the
borrower's reputation, not require enhanced covenant levels. A borrower, consequently,
may be more inclined to act in a manner consistent with its lenders' interests to the extent
18 1
it benefits from an improved reputation.
One note of caution: Although the traditional framing suggests a role for reputation
in reducing agency costs, it acknowledges that even "sainthood" cannot drive that cost to
zero. 182 Borrowers and lenders have short memories, and so the incentives that make
reputation valuable can shift with change in the marketplace. 183 Therefore, while greater
reputation may cause a decline in loan covenants, we would anticipate some level of
continued reliance on contract in order to protect lenders' and purchasers' interests.
Here, again, Drucker and Puri offer helpful guidance. In their study, borrowers with
credit ratings evidencing a strong reputation 184 were found to be more likely to have their
loans sold than those without, reflecting a greater reliance on reputation by nonbank
purchasers who did not have direct access to private borrower information. 185 Likewise,
covenants were tighter in loans to borrowers with mixed reputations, reinforcing the
lenders' reliance on traditional protections. 18 6 The lead bank's reputation also affected
covenant levels. Covenants tightened in loans that were originated by less reputable
lenders, in effect, permitting purchasers to discount the lead bank's role by increasing the
informational content of covenants and providing them with the opportunity to directly
187
monitor and control the borrower.
What about the decline in covenant levels in cov-lite loans to private equity borrowers? Some portion of the decline can be explained, in part, by the excessive lending of
banks that looked to pass on the resulting credit risk to other investors. 188 Frenzied
competition among bankers for new business and among investors for new loan assets is

180. See Sufi, supra note 3, at 630-31 (describing the effect of reputation on borrowing terms).
181. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the potential for lenders to shift from a reliance
on covenants to reputation).
182. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 351.
183. See William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring,
1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 139-42 (noting "the limited force of reputation").
184. Historically, credit ratings have provided an important assessment of market reputation. See Frank
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of FinancialMarkets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 629-30 (1999) (critically assessing the role of credit rating agencies). However, recent
findings regarding conflicts of interest, inadequate staffing, lack of transparency, and a failure to follow their
own guidelines in connection with subprime residential mortgage-backed securities have drawn the credibility
of credit rating agencies into question. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Study Finds Flawed Practicesat Ratings
Firms,N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at Cl (discussing corrupt rating practices within credit rating firms); STAFF OF
THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF

ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF's EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCtES 1-2

(2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO70808.pdf.
185. Drucker & Puni, supranote 108, at 10-12.
186. Id. at 18-20 (describing hypotheses and study results regarding the relationship between restrictive
covenants and loan salability).
187. Id. at 20-21 (same); see also Joseph A. McCahery & Armin Schwienbacher, Bank Reputation in the
PrivateDebt Market 26 (ECGI Fin. Working Paper No. 231/2009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1333469 (finding that top-tier arrangers certify borrowers that lack a credit rating).
188. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
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also likely to have contributed. 189 Reputation, I suggest, may have also played a role. The
private equity market is principally comprised of a limited group of participants that
interact frequently, suggesting that a reputation as a "good" borrower can have substantial and positive economic consequences. 190 When soliciting capital, private equity sponsors must bank on their reputation as they repeatedly look to raise new funds through
successive investment partnerships. 19 1 Private equity firms also look to develop
192
paying
manager-friendly reputations in order to attract new investment opportunities,
of terminating unattractive deals,
particular attention to the impact on their reputation
93
even during the recent economic downturn. 1
Likewise, for debt, reputation may have provided a credible discipline in light of a
private equity sponsor's ongoing need for successive loans. 194 A failure to act in the
lenders' interest, even if not restricted by contract, could hurt a sponsor's ability to
borrow in the future or increase its cost of raising new debt capital. To that end, Moody's
recently announced it would assess how each sponsor used the proceeds from prior borrowing-in particular, the extent to which proceeds were used to pay dividends to the
sponsor-when deciding what rating to assign to future loans. 195 Thus, while reputation
banks and
alone fails to explain cov-lite loans, it may have provided one basis for why
196
other lenders agreed to dilute covenants before the recent credit slowdown.
D. Private CreditLiquidity
My analysis, so far, has considered existing responses to change in the private credit
market. Syndicate structure, bank incentives, increased covenants and monitoring, and
reputation are all means to reduce the resulting agency costs and balance the potential
decline in debt governance.
A more intriguing response is prompted by greater liquidity in the credit market

189. See BIS, PRIVATE EQUITY, supra note 141, at 30 (describing the influence of CLO managers); Henny
Sender, Din of Roaring Corporate-DebtMarket Drowns out Growing Talk of Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2006, at C1 (noting private equity firms' "clout" in getting better loan terms); Paul J. Davies & Gillian Tett,
Shiny New 'Cov-Lites'Show Signs of Tarnish, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 2007, at 29.

190. See Diamond, Monitoring, supra note 81, at 690, 716 (noting that borrowers with high credit ratings
have lower capital costs); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 351.
191. George W. Fenn et al., The Private Equity Market: An Overview, 6 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. &
INSTRUMENTS 1, 45 (1997).

192. Michael Klausner, InstitutionalShareholders,Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protectionat the IPO
Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 770-75 (2003) (describing the interest of private equity funds to maintain a
reputation for treating successful managers well).
193. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Sorting Through the Buyout Freezeout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at BU6
(noting the initial hesitance of private equity groups to terminate deals due to reputation concerns); Andrew
Ross Sorkin, After the Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at SPGI (stating that reputations are "as important as
bank account balances").
194. See AMIR SUFI, THE REAL EFFECTS OF DEBT CERTIFICATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF
BANK LOAN RATINGS 2-4, 8-9 (2006), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/corporate%20finance%

202006/Sufi.pdf (examining the role of third-party ratings in the syndicated loan market); Ha-Chin Yi & Donald
J. Mullineaux, The Informational Role of Bank Loan Ratings, 29 J. FIN. RES. 481,482-83 (2006).
195.

JOHN ROGERS, PRIVATE EQUITY: TRACKING THE LARGEST SPONSORS 2-4 (2008), available at

http://intl .fp.sandpiper.net/reuters/editorial/images/20080116/divrecaps.pdf.
196. For a discussion of the reduction of cov-lite loans following the credit crisis, see infra note 249 and
accompanying text.
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itself. For equity, the informational content of public share price provides managers with
a means to gauge how well their firm is performing. 197 A change in price may cause
managers to respond quickly to change in the business environment or discourage them
from selecting suboptimal projects that erode firm value. 198 Likewise, for public debt,
secondary trading prices may inform the issuer's managers of how market professionals
assess their policies. 199 Can private credit provide a similar discipline?
Modem financial theory suggests that equity and debt prices should move in tandem
when new information regarding a firm's credit risk is discovered. A lender, within that
analysis, is characterized as the owner of a riskless claim against the borrower who has
also issued a put option on the borrower to its shareholders. If the value of the firm's
assets falls below the face value of its debt, then the firm defaults-with the shareholders,
in effect, exercising their right to "put" the firm to the lender in satisfaction of its
claims. 20 0 The implication is that there is a correlation between the value of a firm's debt
(including credit derivatives) and equity, and so their market prices should adjust at the
same time and to the same information.
In practice, credit derivatives typically react first to new credit information-with
prices in the credit derivatives market moving ahead of both equity and debt, 20 1 as well
as in advance of the public announcement of a negative change in a firm's credit
rating. 20 2 Thus, for a public firm, a change in derivatives pricing may mirror an increase
or decrease in its credit quality before any change in its debt or equity pricing-providing
20 3
more accurate feedback on the perceived riskiness of the firm's policies and projects.
Part of the difference in response reflects the close relationship between the value of a
credit derivative and changes in a firm's default risk. 20 4 Part of it also reflects the special

197. See Gordon, supra note 143, at 1541-63 (describing the improved relationship of price and
performance since the 1950s).
198. See Peter Tufano, Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management, 27 FIN. MGMT. 67, 73-74 (1998)
(stating that "the capital markets are the strongest ally of shareholders"); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the
Public Corporation 9 (Aug. 10, 2006) (revision, originally published as Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=146149 (arguing that capital markets exert the strongest
influence on managers).
199. Amihud et al., supra note 2, at 461-62 (noting that public debt prices provide managers with a market
assessment of their policies).
200. See Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J.
FIN. 449, 455-60 (1974) (describing a model for pricing debt instruments based on the probability of default).
201. Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan & Ian W. March, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Dynamic Relationship
Between Investment-GradeBonds and Credit Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255, 2277-79 (2005); Lars Norden &
Martin Weber, InformationalEfficiency of Credit Default Swap and Stock Markets: The Impact of Credit Rating
Announcements, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2813, 2838 (2004); Jorge A. Chan-Lau & Yoon Sook Kim, Equity
Prices, Credit Default Swaps, and Bond Spreads in Emerging Markets 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
WP/0427, 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0427.pdf; Lars Norden & Wolf
Wagner, Credit Derivatives and Loan Pricing 21 (Nov. 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id--965812 (finding that credit default swap prices are a
dominant determinant of syndicated loan spreads).
202. John Hull, Mirela Predescu & Alan White, The Relationship between Credit Default Swap Spreads,
Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2789, 2799-800 (2004) (analyzing over
200,000 credit default swap bids and offers collected over a five-year period).
203. See GLANTZ, supra note 107, at 518.
204. See Jochen Andritzky & Manmohan Singh, The Pricing of Credit Default Swaps DuringDistress 3-4
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access of market participants, like banks, to private information about borrowers.
an
accurate
provide
not
may
the
market
the extent that information remains private,
indication of a borrower's credit quality. However, as information becomes more
those prices to reflect "real time" changes in the
available to others, we may expect
206
risk.
credit
of
perception
market's
The growth in private credit may, in turn, affect the terms on which subsequent
loans are made. 20 7 Lenders increasingly rely on the pricing of credit instruments to assess
a firm's credit quality and, if necessary, determine the cost of hedging their credit
exposure. Thus, a borrower's actions that change the price at which its existing loans or
other credit instruments trade will influence the price and nonprice terms on which
lenders make subsequent loans. In addition, lenders may tie the interest rates on
8
outstanding loans to changes in the price of a borrower's credit instruments. 20 Actions
that increase credit risk, consequently, will result in a corresponding increase in a
20 9
borrower's cost of capital.
One outcome-as changes in credit risk are reflected in a borrower's loan terms-is
that private credit may begin to overtake covenants and monitoring as an efficient form of
governance. 2 10 Covenants, in general, are over- or under-inclusive of those circumstances
that affect credit quality, reflecting the difficulty of anticipating (and drafting covenants
that adequately reflect) unknown, future events. 2 11 In contrast, by directly affecting a
firm's cost of capital, private credit may provide a more efficient alternative that
penalizes actions that increase credit risk as or shortly after they occur. 2 12 To be clear,
covenants will continue to play an important role in corporate governance-by providing
creditors with direct control rights over borrowers-but some portion of the traditional
reliance may be offset by the feedback provided by an increasingly liquid credit market.
Thus, the impact of more costly debt on a firm's profitability-reflected shortly after a
change in credit quality, either in an outstanding loan's interest rate or in the cost of a
new loan, since firms must return frequently to the market to refinance their debt

(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/06/254, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/
ft/wp/2006/wp06254.pdf (addressing the implication of differences between bond and credit default swap
spreads).
205. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing the banks' ability to obtain borrower
information at lower cost).
206. See supra notes 137--.6 and accompanying text (addressing the flow of information to less informed
investors through competitive pricing).
207. See Norden & Wagner, supra note 201, at 1-4 (discussing the impact of credit default swaps on
interest rates).
208. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (noting factors that may affect a firm's cost of capital).
209. Most of the pricing spread over the riskless rate is tied to default risk. Francis A. Longstaff, Sanjay
Mithal & Eric Neis, CorporateYield Spreads: Default Risk orLiquidity? New Evidencefrom the Credit-Default
Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213,2214-15 (2005).
210. See Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 183,
183-84 (1991) (describing the capital market discipline provided by high-yield debt).
211. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (explaining the imperfections of covenants).
212. As Judge Easterbrook has noted, "Additional ways to price or trade financial instruments ought to
strengthen the capital market as a disciplinary force. What makes the capital market more efficient not only
makes governance less important-in what field does it retain a comparative advantage?-but also makes
governance better." Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securitiesand CorporateGovernance, 69 U. CHI. L. REv.
733, 737 (2002).
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capital 2 13-may lower its share price and, like public equity, discipline managers by
affecting compensation, retention decisions based on price performance, and the
likelihood of a hostile takeover. 2 14 The trick will be in balancing that discipline against
the traditional role of covenants and monitoring-a balance that appears to have been
missed during the market's recent experience with cov-lite loans. 2 15 We can,
nevertheless, begin to see the outline of a new governance mechanism that reflects the
increasing liquidity of an evolving private credit market.

Ron Gilson and I recently raised the possibility that public shareholders may no
longer be a firm's cheapest residual risk bearers. 2 16 We considered the effect on equity of
changes in risk management and the increasing ability of firms to transfer discrete slices
of risk at lower cost through the capital market. 2 17 Risks that were traditionally borne by
the catch-all of public equity-tied, for example,

to changes in weather, foreign

exchange, and interest rates-can now be identified and managed separately. Like private
credit, we suggested that the emergence of new financial instruments enabled firms to

transfer risk more efficiently, providing them with a lower cost alternative to the
traditional reliance on public equity.

2 18

For equity, the result has been the increasing ability of large companies to go or
remain private, making the governance function of private equity available to a wider
range of firms. 2 19 Risks that would have been too concentrated among a small group of
shareholders can now be transferred to others who are better able to manage those risks at

213. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (describing the disciplining effect of the capital market on organizations that
regularly need capital); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 9, at 1083-84 (noting the reliance by even large corporations on short- and medium-term credit).
214. See Gordon, supra note 143, at 1470 (discussing the impact of share prices on managers' decisions).
215. Problems with cov-lite loans following the credit crisis are described infra at note 249 and
accompanying text.
216. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 16, at 231-36.
217. Id.at243-51.
218. Id. at 251-53.
219. Following the onset of the credit crisis in 2007, there were many who predicted that private equity
would die away. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Ranks of the Comfortable Are Still Thinning, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2007, at 8 ("By now, all of Wall Street understands that the private-equity gravy train has jumped the
tracks."). The decline in inexpensive debt financing will, no doubt, limit the aggregate size and returns of
private equity transactions in the short term, perhaps requiring fund managers to diversify into less lucrative
investments. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT 123-24 (2008) [hereinafter BIS, ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2008e.pdfnoframes = 1; Brian Cheffins & John Armour,
The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2008). Yet, private equity has continued to raise new
funds. THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE ADVANTAGE OF PERSISTENCE: How THE BEST PRIVATE-EQUITY
FIRMS "BEAT THE FADE" 7-8 (2008), available at http://www.researchrecap.com/wp-content/
uploads/2008/03/privateequityfeb_2008.pdf. In addition, the prices at which portfolio companies have been
sold have continued to outperform public companies, with expectations that private equity investments will pick
up further when the economy returns. See ERNST & YOUNG, HOW DO PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS CREATE
VALUE? A GLOBAL STUDY OF 2007 EXITS-BEYOND THE CREDIT CRUNCH 4-5, 14 (2008), available at
http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/lntemationalVPrivateEquityBeyondthecredit_crunch_globalstudyof
2007_exits/$file/PrivateEquityCredit Crunch.pdf (reaffirming that the largest businesses owned by private
equity firms outperform public benchmarks).
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lower cost. The result, we predicted, was a greater reliance, at the margin, on more
by private equity managers) in light of
efficient means of corporate governance (provided
2 20
the shift toward new sources of risk capital.
For debt, as I have argued in this Article, growth in the private credit market has
increased the ability of lenders to inexpensively manage and transfer credit risk, resulting
in a shift in the structure and function of debt. Greater liquidity has enabled lenders and
other investors to diversify their portfolios at lower cost than presumed within the
traditional framing. Going forward, we may begin to anticipate a new form of debt
governance, as covenants and monitoring give way to the discipline provided by more
liquid credit instruments in response to increasing completeness in the private credit
market.
Both stories illustrate a characteristic of the financial system: Although its core
function-namely, the inexpensive allocation of capital-is likely to remain unchanged
over time, changes in the capital market and the emergence of more efficient means of
raising capital may impact the institutions that support it. 22 1 Thus, for equity, discrete
slices of risk capital can increasingly be provided by sophisticated counterparties who are
better able than public shareholders to manage and diversify their exposure. Likewise, for
debt, greater liquidity in the private credit market has enabled new lenders and investors
to provide working capital to a wider range of borrowers. The upshot is that institutions
that provide capital are likely to evolve in line with growing completeness in the capital
market.
Of course, new institutions and new instruments may raise their own set of agency
costs. Thus, as illustrated by the evolution of debt, we may anticipate a change in how
agency costs are controlled-resulting in a more efficient governance structure consistent
with growth in the capital market.
Here, we begin to see a divergence between the equity and debt stories. For equity,
new sources of risk capital have reinforced the staying power of private equity, but (so
far) have not become a meaningful source of governance themselves. Accordingly, while
new means of transferring risk may support a new governance structure, we would expect
the actual oversight to be provided by private equity managers (who, as shareholders,
bear the residual risk remaining in the firm). The resulting difference between who
controls and who bears risk may create a mismatch between risks transferred and risks
retained, commonly referred to as "basis risk.' ' 222 Nevertheless, on balance, the benefits
of managing and transferring risk may be expected to outweigh the resulting cost.
For debt, the discipline imposed by an increasingly transparent market may begin to
overtake the traditional reliance on covenants and monitoring. Greater liquidity and the
ability to transfer credit risk at lower cost have resulted in the growth of the private credit
market. Unlike equity, however, the credit market has evolved in response to changes in
risk bearing-resulting in the modification of how loans and syndicates are structured in
response to changing agency problems. Over time, new bearers of credit risk may begin
to provide a more efficient governance function than presumed within the standard

220.
221.
263, 270
222.

Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 16, at 251-57.
See Robert C. Merton, The Financial System and Economic Performance, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES.
(1990) (differentiating product and institutional change).
Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 16, at 238.
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framing. The decline in covenants and monitoring, we may expect, will be offset by a
govemance function that directly reflects change in credit quality in a firm's cost of
capital.
Equity and debt have also diverged in what capital sources-public versus privatethey have accessed as the capital market has grown more complete. Risk transfer
instruments have begun to overtake public equity as lowest-cost risk bearer. The public
trading of those instruments may lower transaction costs, although for the time being, a
large volume remains in the private market. Private equity, as well, is characterized by
limited liquidity among a small group of manager-shareholders. Private credit
instruments, by contrast, have developed in line with growing liquidity in the credit
market. Those instruments have been fueled, in part, by the increasing ability to buy and
sell credit risk-with an expanded universe of lenders and investors who are better able
to provide debt capital at lower cost. The outcome has been a shift, on the equity side,
from a traditional reliance on public equity to the increasing ability to rely on private
market instruments. On the debt side, greater efficiency in the debt market has resulted in
a move away from covenants and monitoring in private loans toward a greater reliance on
liquid credit instruments. Covenants may still play an important role, but supplemented
by the disciplining effect of the private credit market. The result raises an interesting (and
provocative) speculation: rather than the traditional construct-premised on public equity
and private loans-canwe begin to see a new capital structure grounded in private equity
223
and a liquid creditmarket?
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this shift in capital structure helped fuel the most
recent private equity wave-with equity moving from a reliance on public shareholders
to private share ownership, and debt moving from illiquid to increasingly liquid credit
instruments, resulting in a corresponding change in corporate governance. 224 Rather than
the absence of external oversight, as is often claimed when firms go private, the increasing liquidity of the private credit market-and, over time, the ability of market
participants to raise or lower a firm's cost of capital-may begin to provide an effective

223. This question comes at an interesting time, as the distinction between the private and public markets
has become increasingly blurred. Most recently, a liquid secondary market for the purchase and sale of private
equity shares has developed among large institutional investors through the creation of trading platforms by
Wall Street's largest firms, resulting in the introduction of a consolidated platform operated by NASDAQ. See
Anuj Gangahar, Wall Street Banks Create PrivatePlacements Market, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 2007, at
17, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0l274a3b/c-4ac8-Ildc-9Sb5-0000779fd2oc.html?nclick- check-I
(discussing Wall Street banks' joint venture to create a new market for private placements). The effect is
potentially to permit private equity to combine the traditional agency cost benefits of control and monitoring by
a single large shareholder with the liquidity of an active trading market. Larry Ribstein describes the declining
benefits of being public, and the shift toward new business forms, in Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the
Uncorporation 3-21 (Univ. of Ill., Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1003790.
224. See Jackson, supra note 154, at 20 (noting that private equity funds "take out highly leveraged loans
[to fund their purchases]. The issuing banks then hand those to the investment banks, which package them up
into derivatives and add vastly more leverage in the process."); Plender, supra note 154, at 16 (noting the
relationship between growth in the credit derivatives market and private equity investment); Ulf Axelson et al.,
Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts: An Empirical Analysis 9-10 (Aug. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1027127 (describing a typical private equity
structure).
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substitute (in addition to emerging guidelines on voluntary public disclosure 225), with the
resulting decline in agency costs making this new capital structure a competitive
alternative. The outcome, like the standard construct, reflects the capital market of the
period-but, with increasing completeness, it may now also reflect costs and benefits
beyond those arising from the sibling rivalry of debt and equity.
V. SOME LESSONS FROM THE CREDIT CRISIS

Current turmoil in the financial markets has called into question the nature and
extent of change in the private credit market. The subprime loan crisis triggered a more
general scrutiny of credit instruments, 22 6 resulting in a slowdown in commercial lending,
an uptick in loan defaults, and in the short term, a contraction in the private credit
market. 227 I suggest some preliminary lessons from the credit crisis-specifically, from
the perspective of debt governance-although the global financial markets remain fragile
and further change is likely. 22 8 Predicting how, and whether, those lessons are reflected
in the credit market is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet, increased regulatory and
market focus suggest that, rather than halting growth, the current downturn may lead to a
229
healthier financial system and further expansion of private credit.
Perhaps most significantly, the breadth and impact of the credit crisis-extending
beyond risky mortgage loans to multiple asset classes, including commercial loanssuggests a shift in how the financial markets should be regulated. The current crisis has
differed in scope from financial crises in the past-reflecting transactions between bank
and nonbank investors, from around the world, that arose out of innovative financial
instruments, complex investment strategies, and a less-than-transparent credit market.
Rather than a focus only on banks, greater private credit liquidity argues for measures
that broadly address the capital market as a whole and the enhanced corporate
governance function provided by new lenders and investors. 230 Thus, regulators have
225. See DAVID WALKER, GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE EQUITY 24-28
(2007), available at http://walker-gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/wwgreport-final.pdf (setting out voluntary
guidelines for U.K. private equity portfolio companies).
226. See BIS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 219, at 92-103 (discussing the global market crisis of 20072008); Ben S. Bernanke, The Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy Consequences, Speech
Before the Economic Club of New York (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/Bemanke2007l0l5a.htm (discussing the origins of the recent financial turmoil and the
Federal Reserve's response).
227. See Robert Cookson, Sarah O'Connor & Paul J. Davies, Painful Lessons to be Learntfor CDSs, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 2008, at 23 (describing the spread of credit problems beyond the subprime mortgage
market); James Saft, Sharp Drop in Services Bodes Ill, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Feb. 8, 2008, at 14
(describing credit contraction and potential downgrade in corporate bond issues).
228. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET UPDATE I (July 28,
2008), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fmu/eng/2008/02/pdf/0708.pdf (noting the continued
deterioration of credit quality across loan classes).
229. See Bemanke, supra note 226 (noting enhancements in underwriting standards and due diligence for
structured credit products that have emerged); Carter Dougherty, Can Banks Self-Regulate? In Wake of Turmoil,
Calls Grow for New Sorts of Supervision, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Jan. 26, 2008, at 11 (noting proposed
regulatory responses to the current economic crisis).
230. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008) (discussing flawed responses to the subprime mortgage crisis that
fail to account for the trend towards greater disintermediation).
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begun to reassess financial regulation, suggesting that the traditional focus, for banks, on
capital regulation to cushion against financial shocks may need to be supplemented by a
new system of supervision that increasingly takes into account growth and innovation in
23 1
private credit.
In addition, traditional means to monitor borrowers may no longer be able to keep
up with innovation in the capital market. In the past, investors who lacked direct access to
borrower information could, in part, make up the difference by relying on credit rating
agencies to monitor in their place; changes in credit quality were reflected in a borrower's
credit rating. 232 The credit crisis revealed problems with the rating process itself, raising
questions regarding the integrity of rating agencies' reviews. 2 33 More troubling, however,
was the apparent difficulty that rating agencies faced when assessing increasingly
complex credit instruments, drawing into question the ability of investors to rely on
future ratings pronouncements. 234 Stated differently, while increased liquidity may have
enabled a growing dispersion of credit risk, the transfer of risk to investors who were
unable-or unwilling-to assess their exposure may have resulted in an overall decline in
235
oversight.
One solution is increased regulation of the rating agencies, supporting a more
rigorous credit rating process and reinforcing the agencies' role as low-cost providers of
monitoring services. 236 Another is enhanced risk management-imposed by regulators23 7 or the result of self-imposed market discipline 23 8-as investors become more
231. See Timothy F. Geithner, Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System, Remarks at The
Economic Club of New York (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2008/tfg080609.html (outlining proposals for regulatory reform to reduce systemic risk).
232. The due diligence process was normally extensive, with rating agency representatives typically
meeting with the borrower's management and developing the same sort of information that was traditionally
provided to a bank lender. Yi & Mullineaux, supra note 194, at 482-83.
233. See supranote 184 (noting the recent decline of credit rating agency credibility).
234. See Richard Beales, Saskia Scholtes & Gillian Tett, Failing Grades?,FIN. TIMES (London), May 17,
2007, at 8 (questioning the credit agencies' ability to keep up with the financial market in light of recent
"missteps and controversies"); Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDO Boom Masks Subprime Losses,
Abetted by S&P, Moody's, Fitch, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 31, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601010&sid=ajs7BqG4_X8I&refer=news (discussing the "little-understood-role" which credit
agencies play in assessing the risks of collateralized debt obligations).
235. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008,
at BUI (noting that senior Wall Street bankers did not completely understand new products).
236. See Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses: Hearing Before the
US. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (July 15, 2008) (testimony of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/-files/
CoxSECtestimony7l508Final.pdf (discussing SEC regulations to examine credit rating procedures). For a
different take on the rating agencies' role in the subprime crisis, see Schwarcz, supranote 230, at 400-04.
237. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES DURING THE
RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE 6 (2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/
2008/SSGRiskMgtdoc final.pdf (describing the supervisory response to shortcomings in risk management).
238. See Gordon Platt, Looking Across the Abyss, CDOs Will Come Back in Simpler Form, Some Market
ParticipantsSay, GLOBAL FIN. MAG., Mar. 2008, at 60 (noting the need for financial institutions to reassess
their organizational approach to risk management); Eric S. Rosengren, Risk-Management Lessons from Recent
Financial Turmoil, Speech Before the Conference on New Challenges for Operational Risk Measurement and
Management 14 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2008/
051408.htm (noting that banks which underestimated risk exposed themselves to failure, acquisition, or capital
deficiencies).
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sophisticated in analyzing the credit instruments they buy and sell and, more importantly,
realizing the competitive benefits of an enhanced risk management system. 239 A third
response, also market-imposed, may be a decline in the complexity of instruments that
are used to hedge credit risk. In the face of greater uncertainty, firms may choose to
hedge risk with less complicated, and more transparent, instruments that they are better
able to price and manage. 240 The result, in all three cases, would be a greater ability of
investors to assess their credit exposure-and, in turn, manage that exposure directly or
reflect it in the price at which they buy and sell instruments in the private credit market.
The credit crisis also reinforced the need for enhanced transparency regarding the
products being sold. Before the credit downturn, a substantial portion of commercial
loans was bought by CLOs, which sold interests in loan pools to investors in order to
fund their purchases. 2 4 1 The transfer of risk, from banks to the holders of CLO securities,

potentially resulted in a decline in the sponsor's incentive to monitor portfolio
borrowers-perhaps offset by the sponsor's continued retention of some portion of the
risk or its concern over reputation in the event of default. 2 4 2 Going forward, investors
may insist that a CLO sponsor increase its credit exposure to the underlying loan
portfolio, perhaps through changes in the off-balance-sheet treatment of securitized assets
in CLO or other vehicles 2 4 3 or by requiring the sponsor to retain some portion of the
244
most junior CLO tranche rather than repackaging it for sale to other investors.
Investors may also require greater information on the underlying loan portfolio, as well as
the sponsor's determination of asset value and credit quality, in order to conduct their

own credit analysis of the borrowers.

245

239. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 237, at 1-6 (finding that differences in risk management
practices affected losses incurred during the credit crisis); James Maxwell, Ratings Agencies Eye ERMfor All
Industries,FIN. EXECUTIVE, Mar. 2008, at 44, 46.
240. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that fund managers expect to increase their hedging
of risks, as well as a reduction in the complexity of derivative instruments); see also Schwarcz, supra note 230,
at 405 (noting that "[s]olving problems of financial complexity may well be the ultimate twenty-first century
market goal").
241. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of CLOs).
242. See Duffie, supra note 16, at 10-12; Goldschmid, supranote 120, at 256 n.229; see also supra notes
163-66, 178-79 and accompanying text.
243. See Joseph Rosta, FASB Lobs a Balance-Sheet Bombshell, U.S. BANKER, June 2008, at 60 (describing
a proposed accounting change to move securitized assets on to a CLO sponsor's balance sheet); John W. White
& James L. Kroeker, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 110th Congress, Regarding Transparency in Accounting,
Proposed Changes to Accounting for .Off-Balance Sheet Entities (Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/tsO918O8jww-jlk.htm (promoting proposals by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board to amend current accounting standards in order to promote greater financial
reporting transparency).
244. See Paul J. Davies, Getting Rid of Unwanted Leftovers, FT.COM, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93499456-6d8a-1 lda-a4df-0000779e2340.html (discussing the efforts of banks to
unload high risk credit to investors); Dr. Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, I IOth Congress, Regarding the Financial Crisis and the
Role of Federal Regulators (Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20081023100438.pdf (suggesting a requirement that "all securitizers retain a meaningful part of the securities
issue").
245. Platt, supra note 238, at 62. Greater transparency, in order to be effective, may also require a decline
in the complexity of the instruments that are purchased. See Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 11- 15.
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Market transparency may also improve. Although regulators may be able to assess
firms under their authority, the private credit market is comprised of investors, such as
hedge funds, who fall outside of regular review. Regulations or industry initiatives that
enhance transparency-in pricing, secondary trading, and ownership-may help address
systemic concerns arising from the possibility of accumulations of risk over which
neither regulators nor market participants today are aware. 246 Doing so may also enhance
the availability of information in the private credit market and the informational content
of trading prices. 24 7 Likewise, a centralized derivatives counterparty or clearinghouse
may improve market transparency and enhance liquidity in the credit default swaps
24 8
market.
Finally, the credit crisis has reinforced the importance of covenants to lenders,
notwithstanding the increased ability to manage and transfer credit risk. Cov-lite loans, in
hindsight, failed to strike a proper balance between liquidity and a lender's traditional
reliance on covenants and monitoring. Thus, even though the default rate on leveraged
loans has been relatively low, it more likely reflects a decline in covenant levels rather
than the borrowers' credit quality. Absent those trip-wires, lenders have been
handicapped in exercising control rights, reducing their ability to minimize any resulting
lOSS. 2 4 9 In the face of the credit downturn, however, prospective lenders are likely to
return to more prudent practices.
VI. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that a presumption underlying the traditional framing
of the firm-namely, the reliance of debt on covenants and monitoring-may no longer
be settled. Changes in the credit market have provided lower cost alternatives, resulting
in an evolution in the role of debt in corporate governance.
The traditional framing was premised on the relative illiquidity of debt. Banks with
access to private information were able to extend loans at lower cost than other lenders,
but looked to covenants and monitoring as a principal means to manage credit risk. Alternatives, such as portfolio risk management, were limited to equity.
The last two decades, however, have witnessed a transformation in the traditional
bank-borrower relationship. Prompted by regulatory and competitive change, banks
began to reconsider the lending business-looking to minimize portfolio-level credit risk
by actively buying and selling loans and other credit instruments. The result was growth
in the private credit market, with greater liquidity generating higher returns on a bank's
loan portfolio, a portion of which could be passed on to borrowers through increased
246. See Acharya et al., supra note 154, at 53.
247. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
248. See Heather Landy, Credit Default Swaps Oversight Nears; SEC, FederalReserve, CFTC Pledge to
Work Together on Regulating Derivatives, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2008, at D3 (reporting pressure from
government officials for Wall Street to develop a central credit default swap clearinghouse); Stephen Labaton,
Obama Plans FastAction to Tighten FinancialRules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at Al (noting plans for credit
default swaps to trade through a central clearinghouse and one or more exchanges).
249. See Davies & Tett, supra note 189 (noting that cov-lite loans remove most of the traditional
protections afforded to lenders); Jonathan Keehner & Megan Davies, LBO Companies'Health Could Be Worse
Than it Looks, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleld=USN3064216020080130
(discussing how cov-lite loans affected default rates).
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lending limits and lower interest rates. Market participants have relied on syndicate
structure, lead bank incentives, increased covenants and monitoring, and reputation to
minimize the resulting agency costs and, in turn, introduce new forms of corporate
governance.
Over time, with greater liquidity, changes in a firm's credit quality may increasingly
be reflected in the pricing of its credit instruments. And, to the extent that pricing is
reflected in subsequent loans, changes that increase a firm's credit risk may be
contemporaneously reflected in a higher cost of capital. Private credit may, as a result,
begin to provide a more efficient "real time" discipline that supplements a lender's
traditional reliance on covenants and monitoring.
A central theme of this Article has been that change in the capital market may
increasingly affect capital structure and corporate governance. My principal focus has
been on the implication of that change for how firms are governed. It may be useful to
end this Article by considering the other side of the coin-namely, the implication for
capital market regulation of the evolution of debt. To the extent that change in the capital
market affects corporate governance, should we begin to consider the impact of that
regulation-beyond its traditional focus on market integrity and systemic risk-on how
firms are governed?
Consider, for example, a bank's regulatory capital requirements. Changes in
minimum capital levels may lower systemic risk, but will also affect how private credit
instruments are structured and traded. 2 50 Should their impact on corporate governance
become a part of the calculus in deciding which regulations to adopt? Likewise,
regulating the credit derivatives market may level the playing field among participants,
but potentially lower the market's ability to reflect information about a firm's credit
quality. 251 Again, should the impact on corporate governance be weighed against
concerns over market integrity?
Those questions mirror the evolving nature of debt and its transition away from the
sibling rivalry that previously fixed a firm's capital structure and corporate governance.
They suggest, as well, that corporate governance may increasingly become an important
consideration in our regulation of the capital market. I have offered some initial lessons
from the credit crisis, reflecting its impact on debt governance. However, a more
comprehensive analysis of the new construct-and how it plays into regulating change in
the capital market-must be left for another day.

250. See Nicol6 & Pelizzon, supra note 139, at 2-3 (discussing the potential implications of different
capital adequacy rules).
251. See Acharya & Johnson, supra note 119, at 113 (cautioning that regulatory action against insider
trading in the credit default swap market may have negative effects on liquidity and pricing).
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